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Abstract
In this thesis we are concerned with Markov’s principle, a statement that originated in the Rus-
sian school of Constructive Mathematics and stated originally that “if it is impossible that an
algorithm does not terminate, then it will terminate”. This principle has been adapted to many
diUerent contexts, and in particular we are interested in its most common version for arithmetic,
which can be stated as “given a total recursive function f , if it is impossible that a there is no n
for which f(n) = 0, then there exists an n such that f(n) = 0”. This is in general not accepted in
constructivism, where stating an existential statement requires one to be able to show at request
a witness for the statement: here there is no clear way to choose such an n.
We introduce more in detail the context of constructive mathematics from diUerent points of
view, and we show how they are related to Markov’s principle. In particular, several realizability
semantics are presented, which provide interpretations of logical systems by means of diUerent
computational concepts (mainly, recursive functions and lambda calculi). This Veld of research
gave origin to the well known paradigm often called Curry-Howard isomorphism, or also propo-
sitions as types, that states a correspondence between proofs in logic and programs in computer
science. Thanks to this the Veld of proof theory, that is the metamathematical investigations of
proofs as mathematical objects, became of interest for computer science and in particular for the
study of programming languages.
By using modern research on the Curry-Howard isomorphism, we will obtain a more reVned
interpretation of Markov’s principle. We will then use this results to investigate the logical
properties of systems related to the principle.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
DeVning a proper notion of constructive mathematics and building a constructive foundation
of mathematics were two central concerns of mathematical logic in the past century. Starting
with Hilbert’s program, and continuing through other traditions such as Brouwer’s intuitionism,
numerous attempts have been made, often ending up in harsh contrasts - the most famous being
the one between the two just mentioned schools.
The Russian constructive school pursued the program of Constructive Recursive Mathemat-
ics, led by the intuitions of A. A. Markov who was the Vrst in trying to put the notion of algorithm
at the heart of a foundation of mathematics.
Although ultimately less successful in the Veld of constructivism, some of the ideas of Markov
proved later to be fundamental in understanding proofs in Velds of mathematics such as analysis.
In order to present a more modern explanation of Markov’s standpoint, we will Vrst need to
present a more general overview of the context of constructive mathematics.
1.1 The formalist approach
The birth itself of the modern conception of proof theory is often associated with Hilbert’s fa-
mous program. As it was stated in the Grundlagen der Geometrie the program posed four major
problems that should be addressed in order to develop a reliable foundation for a mathematical
theory:
• The formalization of the theory, including a choice of its basic objects, relations, and ax-
ioms.
• The proof of the consistency of the axioms.
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• The question of the mutual independence and completeness of the axioms.
• The decision problem: is there an automatic method for deciding truth of statements in the
theory?
In this thesis, we are mainly concerned with the Vrst two points. These underline the two
main characteristics of Hilbert’s thought: formalism and Vnitism. The Hilbertian formalism re-
quires the elements of the theory to be expressed as certain statements in a formal language; the
mathematical practice thus could be viewed as a manipulation of these statements, in accordance
to some rules. This attracted criticism from other philosophical schools, Vrst and foremost the
intuitionist school, in that it seemed like it was removing the concept of mathematical truth, in
favour of giving rise to a mere mechanical game of symbols. However, the second main aspect
of the Hilbertian standpoint further clariVes the approach also in relation to this criticism: the
main feature of the axiomatic system that was to be sought was its consistency, i.e. the inability
of deriving a contradiction from the axioms; in the original plan, this crucial feature had to be
proved by Vnitistic means. Hilbert meant with this word that they should rely on inspectable1
evidence. Such a consistency proof was seen as something that nobody could doubt of.
Hilbert’s program is tightly linked to Gödel’s famous incompleteness results. We will not
enter in the debate of what incompleteness meant for the development of the program; however,
it is interesting to mention that Gödel clearly speciVed his views with respect to the Hilbertian
Vnitism in his Yale lectures [Göd41]. There, he states that he regards a system as Vnitist if it
satisVes the following points:
• All functions and relations that are primitive in the system are respectively computable
and decidable.
• The existential quantiVer is not primitive in the system. That is, existential quantiVcations
are only an abbreviation for an explicit construction of a witness.
• Universal quantiVcations can be negated only in the sense that there exists a counterexam-
ple in the sense here deVned, that is an explicit construction of a counterexample.
In particular, we will draw inspiration from the second point for our notion of constructive
system:
DeVnition 1 (Constructive system). We call a logical system constructive if it satisVes the fol-
lowing two properties:
Disjunctive property Whenever A ∨B is provable in the system, then either A is provable or
B is provable.
1In German anschaulich
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Existential property Whenever ∃xA(x) is provable in the system, then there exists a term t
such that A(t) is provable.
1.2 Intuitionitic logic and realizability semantics
The intuitionistic school of L.E.J. Brouwer was probably the main opponent of the formalist ap-
proach. We mentioned before that the intuitionists accused Hilbert of reducing the mathematical
practice to a game of symbol manipulation without a real meaning. Indeed, the intuitionists
appealed to a much more sophisticated notion of mathematics, conceiving essentially mathe-
matical objects as free creations of the mind of the mathematicians. The mathematical practice
is then a matter of human communication. Therefore, an object exists only in the moment a
mathematician can mentally construct it: how can one accept an indirect argument as a mental
construction? Clearly, if we can prove the impossibility of the non existence of an object, we
have no way to obtain a construction we can communicate.
The BHK explanation of intuitionistic truth
The refusal of formalism made by Brouwer also prevented him from really accepting any for-
malization of an “intuitionistic logic”. An explanation of the usual logical connectives from the
intuitionistic point of view, and the beginning of the development of an intuitionistic logical
system are due to Brouwer’s student Arend Heyting; this is usually known as the Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, and provides an informal notion of an intuitionistic truth:
• There is no construction of ⊥.
• A construction of A ∧B consists of a construction of A and a construction of B
• A construction of A ∨B consists of a construction of A or a construction of B
• A construction of A→ B is a construction which transforms any construction of A into a
construction of B
• A construction of ∃xA(x) consists of an element d of the domain and a construction of
A(d)
• A construction of ∀xA(x) is a method which transforms every element d of the domain
into a construction of A(d).
Negation is then interpreted as ¬A := A → ⊥. We can already see from this that the
principle of excluded middle A ∨ ¬A is not justiVed under this interpretation: it expands to
A ∨ (A → ⊥), and asks for either a proof of A, or a method to transform proofs of A into the
absurdity; but clearly we have no way to do this in general. The underivability of the excluded
3
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middle as a rule proved to be the common feature of diUerent systems of constructive logic,
and thus intuitionistic logic quickly became interesting per se, regardless of the intuitionistic
standpoint in mathematics.
Realizability semantics
The BHK semantics we have deVned in the previous paragraph allows us to draw some con-
clusions and obtain some initial results about systems of intuitionistic logic, such as the simple
argument we have used to show that the excluded middle is not justiVable. However, one im-
mediately notices how this semantics is voluntarily informal: the notions of construction and
method that are mentioned, are left unspeciVed. Realizability semantics are a family of seman-
tics that can be thought of as concrete versions of the BHK semantics, whenever we consider
a speciVc intuitionistic theory. Historically, the Vrst such example was the original number re-
alizability of Kleene for the intuitionistic system of arithmetic HA [Kle45] that used objects of
recursion theory in order to give concrete meaning to the concepts of construction and algorithm
we used previously. More formally, it states when a number e realizes a formula E by induction
on the shape of the formula:
• e realizes (r = t), if (r = t) is true.
• e realizes (A ∧B), if e codes a pair (f, g) such that f realizes A and g realizesB.
• e realizes A ∨ B, if e codes a pair (f, g) such that if f = 0 then g realizes A, and if f > 0
then g realizes B.
• e realizes A → B, if, whenever f realizes A, then the e-th partial recursive function is
deVned at f and its value realizes B.
• e realizes ¬A, if no f realizes A.
• e realizes ∀xA(x), if, for every n, the e-th partial recursive function is deVned at n and its
value realizes A(n).
• e realizes ∃xA(x), if e codes a pair (n, g) and g realizes A(n).
Since the objects of the domain of interpretation are numbers, we can internalize the notion we
have just deVned by formalizing it inside the same theory of arithmetic we are interpreting. A
formalized realizability semantics together with a semantic soundness theorem (which is often
called adequacy in this framework) allows a Vner analysis of intuitionistic systems. For exam-
ple, given the adequacy of Kleene semantics for a system of intuitionistic arithmetic we could
conclude about constructivity of the system according to our deVnition 1: whenever A ∨ B is
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provable then by adequacy it is realizable, and therefore we will have a realizer coding either a re-
alizer of A or one of B; similarly whenever ∃xA(x) is provable, then by adequacy it is realizable
and the realizer codes some n and a realizer of A(n).
Moreover, realizability is able to tell more about the computational content of intuitionistic
systems. Kleene realizers are understood as codes for a Gödel numbering of the recursive func-
tions, and thus can represent something that we can use in order to compute. Going further in
this direction, Kreisel’s modiVed realizability [Kre59] deVnes realizers as elements of a system of
typed λ-calculus: these can be in turn very similar to statements of a modern functional pro-
gramming language. We can think therefore of realizability interpretations as the link between
constructive systems and computational systems.
1.3 Constructive Recursive Mathematics and the controversy
about Markov’s principle
Constructive recursive mathematics was developed by the Russian school of constructivism start-
ing from the 1940s. Its main contributor was A.A. Markov [MN54], and most of the research
developments in this Veld happened until the 1970s.
In a fashion similar to the Vnitistic approach, the focus in CRM is on the fact that mathemat-
ical objects should be Vnitely representable. In particular, they should be representable by means
of suitably deVned algorithms.
The main points of the approach of CRM are, as found in [TD88]
• The objects of mathematics are algorithms. Algorithms are meant in a mathematically
precise sense in the sense that they should be presented as “words” in some Vnite alphabet
of symbols.
• Limitations due to Vnite memory capacity are disregarded, the length of symbol strings is
unbounded (though always Vnite).
• Logically compound statements not involving ∃, ∨ are understood in a direct way, but
existential statements and disjunctions always have to be made explicit.
• If it is impossible that an algorithmic computation does not terminate, we may assume that
it does terminate.
The last of these points is what is commonly referred to as “Markov’s principle”, and was the
main point of controversy between the intuitionists and the Russian school. Indeed, all the points
that were listed Vt naturally in classical recursion theory; if we think at Markov’s principle in this
context, it represents unbounded search: it is certain that the algorithm will halt at some point,
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but there is no guarantee that this will happen before the end of the universe. This was Vrmly
disagreed by intuitionists and indeed we will see that it cannot be proven from intuitionistic
logic.
1.4 Natural deduction and the Curry-Howard isomorphism
In section 1.2 we highlighted how realizability sets a correspondence between constructive sys-
tems and models of computation. An even deeper link was noted by Haskell Curry: the rules for
implication introduction and elimination of natural deduction ( Vg. 1.1) can be put in correspon-
dence with the rules for abstraction and application of Church’s simply typed lambda calculus.
Even though it was known from the 1940s, this correspondence was not further explored until
some decades later. A reason for this delay could be found in the similar lack of success of the
proof system of Natural Deduction. Introduced by Gentzen together with the immediately more
popular Sequent Calculus, Natural Deduction presents inference rules in couples of introduction
and elimination rules for every logical connective. Its other feature is that proofs are dependent
on assumptions that can be made and then discharged (represented by bracketing), thus rendering
the proof independent of the previously made assumption. A system of natural deduction for
intuitionstic logic is presented in Vg. 1.1.
Sequent calculus provided a more technically convenient presentation of classical logic; more-
over, Gentzen introduced it with the speciVc aim of proving its consistency, by means of what
became to be known as Gentzen’s Hauptsatz, or cut-elimination theorem. Since we are not inter-
ested in sequent calculus, we will not talk about this theorem further. We are however interested
in a somehow corresponding notion in the framework of natural deduction, which is proof nor-
malization. A normal proof is one where no detours appear; formally, a detour is a conVguration
in which an introduction rule is immediately followed by an elimination of the same connective
that was introduced. Given that the two kinds of rules are one the inverse of the other, such an
inference can be removed in order to make the proof more direct: an example of such procedure
is shown in Vg. 1.2.
Normalization then is the process of removing detours from a proof, with the aim of obtaining
a normal one. As we mentioned, the unavailability of a normalization theorem 2, stating that
every proof could be normalized, meant that sequent calculus became the system of choice for a
long period, until Dag Prawitz Vnally crafted a direct normalization proof for natural deduction
in 1965.
In his work (see for example [Pra06]), Prawitz further clariVed a key feature of the rules of
natural deduction: the introduction rules can be thought of as deVnitional rules that describe
2In his thesis Gentzen had actually included a set of detour conversions and a proof of normalization for intu-
itionistic natural deduction. However this remained unknown until 2005, when a manuscript of the thesis was found.
For more details see [PG08]
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...
A1
...
A2
∧-I
A1 ∧A2
...
A1 ∧A2 ∧-E1A1
...
A1 ∧A2 ∧-E2A2
[A]
B
→-I
A→ B
...
A→ B
...
A
→-E
B
...
A ∨-I1A ∨B
...
B ∨-I2A ∨B
...
A ∨B
[A]
C
[B]
C
∨-E
C
...
A ∀-I (x not free in the assumptions)
∀xA
...
∀xA
∀-E
A[t/x]
...
A[t/x]
∃-I
∃xA
...
∃xA
[A]
C ∃-E (x not free in C and in the assumptions)
C
⊥
⊥-E
A
Figure 1.1: Natural deduction for intuitionistic logic
when one is allowed to assert a certain connective, and thus its meaning; in the same way, elimi-
nation rules can be seen as operational rules that describe how one can use a formula depending
on its main connective 3.
As natural deduction started gathering more interest, William Howard studied more in depth
the relationship between deduction rules of natural deduction and typing rules of typed lambda
calculus, and presented what came to be known as the Curry-Howard isomorphism [How69].
3This idea was already expressed by Gentzen: The introductions constitute, as it were, the “deVnitions” of the
symbols concerned, and the eliminations are, in the Vnal analysis, only consequences of this, which may be expressed
something like this: At the elimination of a symbol, the formula with whose outermost symbol we are dealing may be used
only “in respect of what it means according to the introduction of that symbol”. ([Gen35])
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[A]
...
B
∀-I
A→ B
...
A
∀-E
B
❀
...
A
...
B
Figure 1.2: Normalization of a non-normal proof
Under this isomorphism, formulas are put in correspondence with types, hence the title of
Howards’s work The formulae as types notion of construction; the correspondence stretches even
further, and takes diUerent names according to the diUerent traditions that originated from the
original work. We borrow the terminology of Wadler [Wad15] and state the full framework as:
• Propositions as types, the original intuition of Howard
• Proofs as programs: since every proof tree can be made to correspond with a type deriva-
tion, we have a lambda term corresponding to the proof.
• SimpliVcation of proofs as evaluation of programs: the process of detour removal is nothing
but a computation, where a complex term gets reduced in order to obtain a result of the
computation.
1.5 Contents of the thesis
Modern research in the Curry-Howard tradition draws heavily from all the standpoints we brieWy
discussed. It stems from constructivism, and intuitionistic systems are the base for most Curry-
Howard systems; it is formalist in the sense that proofs are the main object of the investigation;
it is Vnitist in the sense that, in addition to the requirement that objects of computation should
be Vnite, it tries to make sense of classical reasoning by these means.
We will sit in this tradition, and therefore although the main object of the discussion will be
a mathematical principle, we will be interested in its computational and metalogical properties.
As it was already mentioned, Markov’s principle was already controversial in the debate about
constructivism and foundations in the Vrst half of the XX century: chapter 2 will be devoted to
a more in-depth accounting of the birth of realizability semantics and of the status of Markov’s
principle in each of them.
After that we will introduce some results in the more modern line of research of realizability
and Curry Howard systems for classical logic. In chapter 3, we shall introduce a Curry Howard
system able to provide a realizability semantics for the semi-classical system of arithmetic with
8
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limited excluded middle (HA + EM1). In chapter 4 we will prove some additional results on the
computational and constructive properties of HA + EM1, and we will use them to give a new
computational interpretation of Markov’s principle.
Based on the intuitions of chapter 4, chapter 5 will introduce a Curry Howard system for
a system of full classical arithmetic and a corresponding restricted version that will be shown
constructive thanks to Markov’s principle.
9

CHAPTER 2
Intuitionistic realizability and
Markov’s principle
Intuitionistic logic proved to be the underlying logic for many kinds of constructive mathemat-
ics. Therefore it is often referred to as the constructive logic. The idea of realizability semantics
originated in the context of intuitionistic systems, and so where the Vrst Curry-Howard sys-
tems: indeed it was long believed that these were the only systems that allowed a computational
interpretation.
After introducing the basic ideas of intuitionistic arithmetic needed to develop the theory
of realizability, this chapter will present some classical realizability results and their relation to
Markov’s principle.
2.1 Heyting Arithmetic and Markov’s principle
Throughout the introduction we made continuous references to Arithmetic. By this name we
mean, in its broadest sense, the theory of natural numbers with the usual operations of sum
and product. From the point of view of logic, although a complete axiomatization cannot exist
because of Gödel’s theorems, the most common axiom system for this theory is known as Peano
Arithmetic,PA. It takes the name from Giuseppe Peano, and in its modern presentation it consists
of a classical theory over the language with constant terms 0, s,+ and the predicate =, with the
axioms
• ∀x(x = x)
• ∀x∀y(x = y → y = x)
11
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• ∀x∀y∀z(x = y → y = z → x = z)
• ∀x∀y(x = y → sx = sy)
• ∀x∀y(sx = sy → x = y)
• ∀x(sx = 0→ ⊥)
• ∀x(x+ 0 = x)
• ∀x∀y(x+ sy = s(a+ b))
• ∀x(x · 0 = 0)
• ∀x∀y(x · sy = (x · y) + x)
• ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ϕ(sx))→ ϕ(0)→ ∀xϕ(x), for all formulas ϕ
The Vrst four axioms deVne our notion of equality as an equivalence relation preserved by the
successor operation. Then the following two state that the successor is a bijection between the
naturals and naturals greater than zero. After them we have the deVnitions for addition and
multiplication, and Vnally the induction axiom scheme.
By Heyting Arithmetic, HA, we mean the intuitionistic theory of the same axioms. In this
context, we formulate Markov’s principle as the statement
¬¬∃xA(x)→ ∃xA(x)
where A is a quantiVer-free formula. Alternatively, we can also use the following form, which is
equivalent under the axioms of HA:
¬∀xA(x)→ ∃x¬A(x)
It was mentioned in the introduction that the intuitionists did not accept Markov’s principle. In
line with this, neither of the formulas we just presented can be proved in the system of Heyt-
ing’s intuitionistic arithmetic; however as we are going to see realizability interpretation provide
mixed answer on this.
2.2 Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation
Although not usually included under the category of realizability interpretations, the functional
interpretation of intuitionistic arithmetic introduced by Gödel, commonly referred to as the Di-
alectica interpretation [Göd58], is probably the Vrst step into this line of research. As is made
explicit in the title of the series of lectures where he Vrst introduced his ideas, In what sense is
intuitionistic logic constructive [Göd41], Gödel aimed at making clearer the constructive meaning
12
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of the intuitionistic logical constants. In order to do this, he proposed a system of typed recursive
functionals where to interpret intuitionistic theories; this approach was in his opinion Vnitist, as
we noted in the introduction, and therefore more suitable to develop an analysis of constructivity
and consistency.
Formally, the Dialectica interpretation assigns to every formula F of HA a formula FD in a
system of typed functionals that we will call T; FD is of the form ∃y∀zA(y, z, x), where x, y, z
are list of variables of arbitrary type and A is quantiVer free. The deVnition is by induction on
the structure of the formula: for A atomic, AD = A (identifying the symbols of the languages
HA and T); if FD = ∃x∀yA(x, y) and GD = ∃u∀vB(u, v), then
• (F ∧G)D = ∃x, u∀y, v(A(x, y) ∧B(u, v))
• (F ∨G)D = ∃t, x, u∀y, v(t = 0→ A(x, y) ∧ t = 1→ B(u, v))
• (∀zF )D = ∃X∀z, yA(X(z), y, z)
• (∃zF )D = ∃z, x∀yA(x, y, z)
• (F → G)D = ∃U, Y ∀x, vA(x, Y (x, v))→ B(U(x), v)
• (¬F )D = ∃Y ∀x¬A(x, Y (x))
Note that 6 follows from 5 when deVning ¬A = A → ⊥. If we compare this with the usual
BHK semantics, which also forms the basis of other realizability semantics, we can see that it is
substantially diUerent in particular in the deVnition of the implication: here we Vnd no mention
of a method to transform “any proof” as we had in BHK.1
If one thinks of the Dialectica as a Game Semantics, its peculiarity becomes clearer: consider
a game between two players, where we win if we Vnd a term u such that there is no t for which
AD(u, t) holds; then we have a winning strategy if we can state ∃x∀y AD(x, y). The cases for
the connectives diUerent from→ is quite intuitive in this framework:
• In the case of A ∧B, we need to Vnd winning strategies x for A and u for B
• In the case of A ∨B, we declare (depending on t) whether we are going to give a winning
strategy x for A or u for B
• In the case of ∀x A, we need to give a winning strategy X(z) for A(z) for every numeral
z the opponent might give
1With regard to this, Gödel noted: “[the fact that one does not need to quantify over all proofs] shows that the
interpretation of intuitionistic logic, in terms of computable functions, in no way presupposes Heyting’s and that,
moreover, it is constructive and evident in a higher degree than Heyting’s. For it is exactly the elimination of such
vast generalities as “any proof” which makes for greater evidence and constructivity.” [Göd72]
13
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• In the case of ∃x A, we need to give a numeral z, together with a winning straregy for
A(z).
The case of implication requires more explanation. Here, the opponent gives us a strategy
x for A: note that it need not be a winning one. In order to win, we need either to provide a
winning strategy for B, or to show that the strategy he gave us was actually not winning. From
this comes the shape of the interpretation of the implication: we need to give a method U to
obtain a strategy for B such that, whenever v is a strategy that wins against U(x), we can build
a strategy Y (x, v) that wins against x.
Markov’s principle and the Dialectica
The diUerence between the BHK semantics and the Dialectica interpretation goes in fact much
farther than this, and although one can easily check that all formulas that are provable in HA
are provable in T, the converse is not the case. It turns out that Markov’s principle is precisely
one of the formulas that obtain a justiVcation in T but are not provable in HA. If we consider the
second form of Markov’s principle introduced in the previous section, we have that
(∀xA)D = ∀xA(x)
(¬∀xA)D = ∃x ¬A(x)
(¬A)D = ¬A
(∃x¬A)D = ∃x ¬A(x)
(¬∀xA→ ∃x¬A)D = ∃U∀x(¬A(x)→ ¬A(U(x)))
Since ∃x¬A(x) is already in the required form, it is not touched by the Dialectica. In the case
of ¬∀x A, the Dialectica interpretation of the negation states that there should be a counterexam-
ple, and asks for a functional that maps witnesses of ∀x A (which are void in the interpretation)
to counterexamples of A; this means that the interpretation is once again ∃x¬A(x). Therefore,
since both formulas get the same interpretation, Markov’s principle can be trivially interpreted.
It is interesting to note that Gödel was aware of this result and viewed it as yet another
example of the fact that intuitionistic logic was not well suited as a basic constructive logic, and
the system T was on the other side behaving much better2
One might now wonder how such an interpretation can be used in practice. Consider the
case where we have an interpretation of the premise ¬∀xA, and we want to use modus ponens
2“The higher degree of constructivity also appears in other facts, e.g., that Markov’s principle ¬∀xA(x) →
∃x¬A(x) (see [Kle60], page 157, footnote) is trivially provable for any primitive recursive A and, in a more general
setting, for any decidable property o of any objects x. This, incidentally, gives an interest to this interpretation of
intuitionistic logic (no matter whether in terms of computable functions of higher types or of Turing functions) even
if Heyting’s logic is presupposed.” [Göd72]
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together with Markov’s principle to get the conclusion. We can easily see that the Dialectica
interpretation validates modus ponens, as shown for example in [Koh08]: assume we have the
two formulas in T
∀y AD(t1, y)
∀x, v (AD(x, t2(x, v))→ BD(t3(x), v))
Then we can take t1 for x in the second formula, and t2(t1, v) for y in the Vrst. This results in
AD(t1, t2(t1, v))
AD(t1, t2(t1, v))→ BD(t3(t1), v)
Therefore we have BD(t3(t1), v) for all v, and thus the functional assigned to B is t3(t1). Thus,
we can view modus ponens as functional application. In our case we have
¬A(t1)
∀y(¬A(y)→ ¬A(U(y)))
And therefore applying modus ponens results in the application U(t1) = t1, since U = λx.x.
2.3 Kleene’s realizability
Kleene was the Vrst to investigate the notion of realizability, and indeed he was the one to intro-
duce the word itself3. Upon developing the system of recursive functions, he aimed at making
the system of intuitionistic arithmetic “more precise”, and he planned to do so by employing the
system of recursive functions he contributed to formalize. More precisely, the objects of the do-
main of the interpretation (i.e. the realizers) are the Gödel numbers of the recursive functions:
thus Kleene’s realizability is often referred to as number realizability.
Consider the standard model of arithmetic N and a standard pairing function 〈−,−〉 : N2 →
N, together with its corresponding projection functions pi1, pi2 such that pii(〈n1, n2〉) = ni. By
{n}mwe represent the result of the computation of the n-th partial recursive function onm, in a
suitable model of the partial recursive functions; by n we mean the numeral (in HA) representing
n. In the classic deVnition of Kleene, any number n is a realizer of a formula F under the
following cirmunstances:
n r s = t if s = t
n rA ∧B if pi1(n) rA and pi2(n) rB
n rA→ B if for allm such thatm rA, {n}m is a terminating computation and {n}m rB
3As mentioned in [Kle45], the initial development of the system is actually due to Kleene’s Vrst student David
Nelson.
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n rA ∨B if pi1(n) = 0 and pi2(n) rA, or if pi1(n) = 1 and pi2(n) rB
n r∀xA(x) if for allm, {n}m is a terminating computation and {n}m rA(m)
n r∃xA(x) if pi1(n) rA( pi2(n) )
We can build a realizer for Markov’s principle according to this deVnition. Consider the
number n such that {n}m = 〈0, µi.A(i)〉; here, µ denotes the usual minimization operation
from the theory of partial recursive functions. This is a realizer of ¬¬∃xA(x)→ ∃xA(x) only if
wheneverm is a realizer of ¬¬∃xA(x), {n}m is a realizer of ∃xA(x). Unraveling the deVnitions,
we need 〈0, µi.A(i)〉 to be a realizer of ∃xA(x), i.e. 0 rA( µi.A(i) ). If one assumes that
µi.A(i) does not correspond to a terminating computation, then this would mean that ∃xA(x)
is not realizabile; in turn, if there is no realizer of ∃xA(x) then any number is a realizer of
∃xA(x) → ⊥ ≡ ¬∃xA(x); Vnally, since we have a realizer for ¬∃xA(x) → ⊥, this would give
us a realizer of ⊥, and thus a contradiction. This ensures the termination of the computation,
and therefore we have A( µi.A(i) ) ≡ ⊤, and any number is a realizer of ⊤.
We can easily see the catch here: the termination of the computation is ensured by classi-
cal reasoning, and what we have done is a simple shift of the classical reasoning contained in
Markov’s principle to the metalevel, in this case the theory of partial recursive functions. This is
of course not satisfying at all from a strictly constructive point of view.
2.4 Kreisel’s modiVed realizability
A big step forward in the Veld of realizability in the direction of computer science was done
by Georg Kreisel with his system of modiVed realizability [Kre59]. Kreisel’s realizability diUer-
entiates itself from Kleene’s by using a typed lambda calculus as the domain of interpretation.
Types here are put in correspondence with formulas of HA, somehow predating Howard’s idea
of completely identifying them by some years; moreover, the use of lambda calculus and the sub-
sequent success of lambda calculus as the foundation for functional programming languages laid
the foundation for the link between computer science and proof theory.
We begin the presentation of modiVed realizability by presenting the system of lambda cal-
culus. First we need to introduce the types we are going to use:
• N is a type (intuitively, the type of naturals)
• If σ, τ are types, then σ → τ , σ × τ , σ + τ are types
Then, we introduce the typed terms of the system:
• For every type σ, a countable set of variables xσ, yσ, . . .
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• 0 : N, s : N→ N
• For all types σ, Rσ : σ → (N→ σ → σ)→ N→ σ
• For all types σ, τ , projections piσ,τ1 : σ × τ → σ, pi
σ,τ
2 : σ × τ → τ and pairing 〈−,−〉 :
σ → τ → σ × τ
• If t : τ , then λxσ.f : σ → τ
• If s : σ → τ , t : σ, then st : τ
And third, the set of reduction rules:
• (λx.t)s 7→ t[s/x]
• pi1(〈s, t〉) 7→ s, pi2(〈s, t〉) 7→ t
• Rxy0 7→ x, Rxy(sz) 7→ yzRxyz
We are now ready to deVne the realizability interpretation. We will not treat directly the case
of ∨, but we will assume that A∨B is a shorthand for ∃x((x = 0→ A)∧ (¬(x = 0)→ B))We
do so by Vrst assigning a type tp(A) to every formula A:
tp(⊥) = tp(s = t) = N tp(A ∧B) = tp(A)× tp(B) tp(A→ B) = tp(A)→ tp(B)
tp(∀xA) = N→ tp(A) tp(∃xA) = N× tp(A)
Finally, we can state
tmr s = t if s = t
tmrA ∧B if pi1(t)mrA and pi2(t)mrB
tmrA→ B if for all s : tp(A), tsmrB
tmr∀xA(x) if for allm : N, tmmrA(m)
tmr∃xA(x) if pi1(t)mrA( pi2(t) )
The term calculus comes with some important properties, the main one being strong nor-
malization. This means that every term will reduce to a normal form after a Vnite number of
reduction steps.
17
2. Intuitionistic realizability andMarkov’s principle
If we analyze modiVed realizability from a game semantical point of view as we did with the
Dialectica, we will notice that it only diUers in the deVnition of the implication. Indeed, here
we go back to a deVnition in the style of the BHK. Game semantically, here we are only talking
about winning strategies: this means that when playing on the formula A → B, the opponent
will always give us a winning strategy forA, to which we should answer with a winning strategy
forB. However, winning strategies cannot be eUectively recognized, so the correctness of moves
cannot be checked: this is why, when it comes to game semantics, the Dialectica represents a
clearer interpretation.
The fact that Markov’s principle cannot be interpreted by means of the modiVed realizability
was already shown by Kreisel [Kre62], and was indeed presented as one of the main points of his
system. One can argue like this: assume that Markov’s principle is realizable. Then in particular,
for every value of n one could realize ¬∀x T⊥(n, n, x) → ∃x T(n, n, x), where T is Kleene’s
predicate and is interpreted as saying “the Turing machine φn terminates the computation after x
steps on input n” (this is known to be primitive recursive and thus representable in HA). Let then
n be Vxed, and since we have that tp(¬∀xT⊥(n, n, x)) = (N → N) → N, consider the dummy
term d := λxNyN.0 : (N→ N)→ N. By applying the realizer of Markov’s principle to this dummy
term, we will get a term of type tp(∃xT) = N× N; this last term will then normalize to a term of
the form 〈m, t〉, such thatm is a numeral. Distinguish two cases:
1. If T(n, n,m) holds, then we have found that the nth Turing machine will halt on input n
afterm steps
2. If T(n, n,m) does not hold, we claim that the nth Turing machine does not halt on input
n. Suppose that it halts, then we would have that ∀x T⊥(n, n, x) is false and thus not
realizable; this in turn means that ¬∀x T⊥(n, n, x) is trivially realizable by any term,
and in particular by the dummy term d; by the deVnition of realizability, the realizer for
Markov’s principle applied to d gives a realizer for ∃xT(n, n, x). We have already denoted
the normal form of this term as 〈m, t〉, and since it is a realizer of ∃xT(n, n, x) it must be
the case that t is a realizer of T(n, n,m). This means that T(n, n,m) holds, which is a
contradiction.
Since the term calculus is strongly normalizing, we would have described a procedure that,
given any m, decides in Vnite time whether the nth Turing machine will halt on input n, which
is well known to be an undecidable problem.
18
CHAPTER 3
Realizability and classical systems
The previous chapter showed how realizability can be employed as a tool to analyze the construc-
tivity of deductive systems, and to extract computational content from proofs in these systems.
Given the constructive nature of realizability semantics and the inherent non constructivity of
classical logic, it would seem impossible to obtain such a semantics for systems based on classical
logic. This was widely believed until the nineties, when a correspondence between control opera-
tors in programming languages and classical reasoning in proofs was discovered. In this chapter,
after a brief history of this idea, we will present a related idea for realizability interpretations
called Interactive realizability. Finally, we will introduce the Curry-Howard system HA + EM1
for intuitionistic arithmetic with classical reasoning limited to formulas of the form ∃xP with P
atomic, together with its realizability interpretation.
3.1 Exceptions and classical logic
Though successful in establishing links between intuitionistic theories and computational mech-
anisms, the Curry-Howard correspondence was for a long time regarded as incompatible with
classical theories. Indeed, if we try to extend to classical logic the system of natural deduction
we have introduced in chapter 1, we need to add a rule either for the excluded middle or for
the double negation elimination (i.e. reductio ad absurdum). In the Vrst case, we need to do a
disjunction elimination without having any possibility of knowing which of the two disjuncts
actually holds; in the second, we assert a formula and all we know is that its negation leads to an
absurdum. It looks like we have no possibilities of recovering any computational construct.
However, we have also mentioned that classical systems of natural deduction too are equipped
with a normalization theorem. It was exactly in this observation that the solution to the riddle
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[¬(α→ β)]
Π1
⊥ ⊥cα→ β
❀
[¬β](1)
[α→ β](2) [α](3)
β
⊥ →-I(2)
¬(α→ β)
Π1
⊥ ⊥c(1)
β
→-I(3)
α→ β
Figure 3.1: Prawitz’s normalization step for reductio ad absurdum on an implication
laid undiscovered for many years1. Let’s take a look at the rules that Prawitz gave for the nor-
malization of the double negation elimination in Vg. 3.1: the aim is to apply the rule ⊥c to a
formula of lower complexity, and so one assumes the negation of the conclusion together with
the entire implication and the antecedent; classical reasoning is then only applied to the negated
assumption. Similar rules were given for the other logical connectives. This reduction looks very
similar to the one that Felleisen gave for his C operator:
C(λk.M)→ λn.C(λk.M [k := λf.k(fn)])
Presented in [Fel88], this operator introduced the notion of continuation, and was the basis for
the introduction of such constructs in programming languages (an example being the construct
call/cc available in Scheme). It was GriXn then, who in [Gri89] proposed to type Felleisen’s
operator as ¬¬A→ A. The idea that sequential control operators could provide a computational
correspondent to classical reasoning (as opposed to pure functional Wow of computation and in-
tuitionistic reasoning) proved to be very successful, and breathed new life into the propositions
as types paradigm. Starting from ideas similar to GriXn’s several other systems were developed,
such as the ones from Parigot [Par92] and Krivine [Kri09]. Generalizing to other control oper-
ators, de Groote [Gro95] showed that mechanisms of exceptions can be put in correspondence
with uses of the excluded middle.
The approach of enriching systems of lambda calculus with imperative constructs provided
also a new way to approach semi-classical principle, by extending Kreisel’s modiVed realizability
with delimited control operators. Using this method, Hugo Herbelin introduced in [Her10] a
system of intuitionistic logic with the addition of two logical rules crafted in order to correspond
to catch and throw instructions for a system of delimited exceptions.
1The link between Prawitz’s reductions and typing of the C operator was established only a posteriori, for example
in [Gro01]
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3.2 Interactive realizability
The possibilities opened by new Curry-Howard correspondences for classical logic did not, on
the other side, provoke a similar number of new systems in the Veld of realizability semantics.
The Vrst and major example remains the work of Krivine [Kri10], who recently applied ideas of
classical realizability to set theory in order to obtain a technique alternative to forcing.
Interactive realizability is a new realizability semantics for classical systems introduced by
Aschieri and Berardi [AB12; ABB13] based on the concept of learning: the main idea is that real-
izers are programs that make hypotheses, test them and learn by refuting the incorrect ones. This
is obtained by means of systems of lambda calculus with exceptions mechanisms: a program will
continue to execute under some assumptions, and whenever it uses an instance of an assump-
tion, the instance gets tested; if the assumption is discovered to be false an exception is raised,
and the program can continue to run using the new knowledge gained from the counterexample.
DiUerent systems of interactive realizability have been put forward for various systems such as
Heyting Arithmetic with limited classical principles, or more recently full Vrst order logic and
non-classical logics.
3.3 The system HA + EM1
Following the terminology of [Aka+04], we will now consider the semi-classical principle EM1,
that is excluded middle restricted to formulas of the form ∃αP with P an atomic predicate2.
System HA + EM1, introduced in [ABB13], applies the idea of interactive realizability to an
intuitionistic logic extended with this principle. We could view this as adding the axiom ∀αNP ∨
∃αN¬P for every atomic P; this however carries no useful computational meaning. The new
principle is therefore treated as a disjunction elimination, where the main premise is the classical
axiom and gets cut.
If we try to Vt this in a Curry-Howard system, we have now two proof terms representing
a construction of the same conclusion, corresponding to the two proof branches where the Vrst
and then the second disjunct are assumed. By looking at the shape of the two assumptions, we
can see that in the Vrst case we need a condition to hold for all values, while in the second we
are looking for a counterexample. The idea is that we should create a new proof term where we
include both possible computations, and during the computation itself we might switch from the
Vrst to the second. Hence the em1 rule that we add to the system has the following form:
Γ, a : ∀αNP ⊢ u : C Γ, a : ∃αN¬P ⊢ v : C
Γ ⊢ u ‖a v : C
Here a represents a communication channel between the two possible computations. The
hypothesis ∀αNP is computationally void: it only serves as a certiVcate for the correctness of
2This class of formulas corresponds with the class of Σ01 formulas of the arithmetical hierarchy
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u; conversely, the branch where we assume ∃αN¬P might ask for an actual witness in order to
proceed. Informally, what we want to accomplish with the reduction rules is that we should
reduce inside u and check for all the used instances of the universal hypothesis whether P[n/α]
is actually true. Whenever one such instance is refuted, we have found a witness for ¬P, and
we can employ it for the execution of v. This is obtained by new terms that we should use when
we introduce assumptions that are to be eliminated via classical reasoning: we introduce the two
typing rules
Γ, a : ∀αNP ⊢ H∀αPa : ∀α
NP
Γ, a : ∃αN¬P ⊢ W∃α¬Pa : ∃α
N¬P
In the Vrst case, we introduce a term that makes the hypothesis that P holds for all values of α;
in the second, the proof term waits for a witness for which P does not hold. From an operational
point of view, terms of the form H∀αP are the ones who can raise an exception, and terms of the
form W∃α¬Pa are those who will catch it.
In Vg. 3.2, we deVne a system of natural deduction for HA+EM1 together with a term assign-
ment in the spirit of Curry-Howard correspondence for classical logic; for a general treatment of
this kind of systems, one could refer to textbooks such as [SU06]. Let L be the language of HA,
three distinct classes of variables appear in the proof terms: one for proof terms, denoted usually
as x, y, . . .; one for quantiVed variables of L, denoted usually as α, β, . . .; one for hypotheses
bound by EM1, denoted usually as a, b, . . .. Atomic predicates are denoted by P,P0,P1, . . .;
moreover, by P⊥ we denote the complement predicate of P, and since atomic predicates are de-
cidable in HA we have that P⊥ ≡ ¬P. In the term u ‖a v all the occurrences of a in u and v
are bound. We assume the usual capture-avoiding substitution for the lambda calculus, and in
addition to this we add a new kind of substitution:
DeVnition 2 (Witness substitution). Let v be any term and n a closed term of L. Then
v[a := n]
is the term obtained replacing every occurrence of W∃αP
⊥
a in v by (n, True) if P[n/α] ≡ False,
and by (n, H∀αα=0a S0) otherwise
Note that the reduction rules for the system in Vg. 3.3 make it clear that the second case will
never actually happen; however it is needed in order to prove the normalization of the system.
3.4 Realizability interpretation of HA + EM1
As we anticipated, this system can be equipped with a realizability interpretation based on the
ideas of interactive realizability. In order to do this, we Vrst need to deVne some classes of terms:
DeVnition 3 (Terms in normal form).
22
3.4. Realizability interpretation of HA + EM1
• SN is the set of strongly normalizing untyped proof terms
• NF is the set of normal untyped proof terms
• PNF is the set of the Post normal forms (intuitively, normal terms representing closed
proof trees made only of Post rules whose leaves are universal hypothesis followed by an
elimination rule), that is: True ∈ PNF; for every closed term n of L, if H∀αPa n ∈ NF, then
H∀αPa n ∈ PNF; if t1, . . . , tn ∈ PNF, then rt1 . . . tn ∈ PNF.
DeVnition 4 (Quasi-Closed terms). If t is an untyped proof termwhich contains as free variables
only EM1-hypothesis variables a1, . . . , an, such that each occurrence of them is of the form H
∀αPi
ai
for some Pi, then t is said to be quasi-closed.
We can now give the deVnition of realizers for HA + EM1. Realizers will be quasi closed
terms, and the deVnition will be by induction on the formula to be realized; the cases for ∧, →
and ∀ are the same as the ones for intuitionistic realizability we are already familiar with. The
case for atomic formulas will need to be extended to take into account the case were we have
open universal assumptions (since realizers are quasi-closed). Finally, the realizers for ∨ and ∃
will need a diUerent kind of deVnition, with induction done also on the shape of the term.
DeVnition 5 (Realizability for HA + EM1). Assume t is a quasi-closed term in the grammar of
untyped proof terms of HA + EM1 and C is a closed formula. We deVne the relation t  C by
induction on C .
1. t  P if and only if one of the following holds:
i) t ∈ PNF and P ≡ False implies t contains a subterm H∀αQa n with Q[n/α] ≡ False;
ii) t /∈ NF and for all t′, t 7→ t′ implies t′  P
2. t  A ∧B if and only if pi0t  A and pi1t  B
3. t  A→ B if and only if for all u, if u  A, then tu  B
4. t  A ∨B if and only if one of the following holds:
i) t = ι0(u) and u  A or t = ι1(u) and u  B;
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ii) t = u ‖a v and u  A ∨B and v[a := m]  A ∨B for every numeralm;
iii) t /∈ NF is neutral and for all t′, t 7→ t′ implies t′  A ∨B.
5. t  ∀αNA if and only if for every closed term n of L, tn  A[n/α]
6. t  ∃αNA if and only if one of the following holds:
i) t = (n, u) for some numeral n and u  A[n/α];
ii) t = u ‖a v and u  ∃α
NA and v[a := m]  ∃αNA for every numeralm;
iii) t /∈ NF is neutral and for all t′, t 7→ t′ implies t′  ∃αNA.
As we said, realizers are quasi closed terms: this means that in general realizers could contain
open universal assumptions, and thus their correctness depends on them. The base cases of the
deVnition of the realizers for the disjunction and existential quantiVers are again the same as
the ones for modiVed realizability; however, we add a second clause that takes into account the
situation where the realizer has used some assumptions; in these cases, we ask that both parts
of a term of the shape u ‖a v are realizers of the formula in their turn. In a realizer with such
a shape, u will then be a realizer with a new open assumption in the form of a term H∀αPa , as
the ones just described; v, on the opposite, needs a witness in order to compute and therefore
we need to substitute a witness in it in order to obtain a realizer. What this means is that these
realizers will still contain a realizer in the usual shape of the clauses (i), but in the form of a
prediction, as we will see in proposition 2.
We conclude the section by giving some properties of the system, as they are found in the
original paper [ABB13], that will be employed in the rest of the thesis. First of all, we deVne a
version of the properties of reducibility candidates in the style of Girard [GTL89]
DeVnition 6. Let t be a realizer of a formula A, deVne the following properties for t, plus an
inhabitation property (CR5) for A:
(CR1) If t  A, then t ∈ SN.
(CR2) If t  A and t 7→∗ t′, then t′  A.
(CR3) If t /∈ NF is neutral and for every t′, t 7→ t′ implies t′  A, then t  A.
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(CR4) If t = u ‖a v, u  A and v[a := m]  A for every numeralm, then t  A.
(CR5) There is a u such that u  A.
Proposition 1. Every term t has the properties (CR1), (CR2), (CR3), (CR4) and the inhabitation
property (CR5) holds.
Proof. By induction on C .
• C = P is atomic.
(CR1). By induction on the deVnition of t  P. If t ∈ PNF, then t ∈ SN. If t /∈ NF is
neutral, then t 7→ t′ implies t  P and thus by induction hypothesis t′ ∈ SN; so t ∈ SN.
Suppose then t = u ‖a v. Since u  P and for all numerals n, v[a := n]  P, we have
by induction hypothesis u ∈ SN and for all numerals n, v[a := n] ∈ SN; but these last two
conditions are easily seen to imply u ‖a v ∈ SN.
(CR2). Suppose t  P. It suXces to assume that t 7→ t′ and show that t′  P. We proceed
by induction on the number of the occurrences of the symbol ‖ in t. If t is neutral, since it
is not the case that t ∈ PNF, by deVnition of t  P we obtain t′  P. Therefore, assume
t is not neutral and thus t = u ‖a v, with u  P and for all numerals n, v[a := n]  P.
If t′ = u or t′ = v[a := m] for some numeral m, we obtain the thesis. If t′ = u′ ‖a v,
with u 7→ u′, then by induction hypothesis, u′  P. So u′ ‖a v  P by deVnition. If
t′ = u ‖a v
′, with v 7→ v′, then for every numeral n, v[a := n] 7→ v′[a := n], and thus by
induction hypothesis v′[a := n]  P. So u ‖a v
′
 P by deVnition.
(CR3) and (CR4) are trivially true by deVnition of t  P.
(CR5). We have that H∀αα=0a S0  P.
• C = A→ B.
(CR1). Suppose t  A → B. By induction hypothesis (CR5), there is an u such that
u  A; therefore, tu  B. By induction hypothesis (CR1), tu ∈ SN and thus t ∈ SN.
(CR2) and (CR3) are proved as in [GTL89].
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(CR4). (⇒) Suppose u ‖a v  A→ B and let t  A. Then (u ‖a v)t  B and by (CR2),
ut ‖a vt  B. By (CR4), ut  B and for all numerals n, v[a := n]t = vt[a := n]  B.
We conclude that u  A→ B and v[a := n]  A→ B.
(⇐). Suppose u  A→ B and v[a := n]  A→ B for every numeral n. Let t  A. We
show by induction on the sum of the height of the reduction trees of u, v, t (they are all in
SN by (CR1)) that (u ‖a v)t  B. By induction hypothesis (CR3), it is enough to assume
(u ‖a v)t 7→ z and show z  B. If z = ut or v[a := n]t, we are done. If z = (u
′ ‖a v)t
or z = (u ‖a v
′)t or (u ‖a v)t
′, with u 7→ u′, v 7→ v′ and t 7→ t′, we obtain z  B by
(CR2) and induction hypothesis. If z = (ut ‖a vt), by induction hypothesis (CR4), z  B.
(CR5). By induction hypothesis (CR5), there is a term u such that u  B. We want to
show that λ_.u  A → B. Suppose t  A: we have to show that (λ_.u)t  B. We
proceed by induction on the sum of the height of the reduction trees of u and t (by (CR1),
u, t ∈ SN). By induction hypothesis (CR3), it is enough to assume (λ_.u)t 7→ z and show
z  B. If z = u, we are done. If z = (λ_.u′)t or z = (λ_.u)t′, with u 7→ u′  B (by
(CR3)) and t 7→ t′  B (by (CR3)), we obtain z  B by induction hypothesis.
• C = ∀αNA or C = A ∧B. Similar to the case C = A→ B.
• C = A0 ∨A1.
(CR1) By induction on the deVnition of t  A0 ∨ A1. If t = ιi(u), then u  Ai, and by
induction hypothesis (CR1), u ∈ SN; therefore, t ∈ SN. If t /∈ NF is neutral, then t 7→ t′
implies t′  A0 ∨ A1 and thus t
′ ∈ SN by induction hypothesis; therefore, t ∈ SN. Sup-
pose then t = u ‖a v. Since u  A0 ∨ A1 and for all numerals n, v[a := n]  A0 ∨ A1,
we have by induction hypothesis u ∈ SN and for all numerals n, v[a := n] ∈ SN. We
conclude as in the case C = P that t ∈ SN.
(CR2). Suppose t  A0∨A1. It suXces to assume that t 7→ t
′ and show that t′  A0∨A1.
We proceed by induction on the deVnition of t  A0 ∨ A1. If t = ιi(u), then t
′ = ιi(u
′),
with u 7→ u′. By deVnition of t  A0 ∨ A1, we have u  Ai. By induction hypothesis
(CR2), u′  Ai and thus t
′
 A0∨A1. If t /∈ NF is neutral, by deVnition of t  A0∨A1,
we obtain that t′  A0 ∨ A1. If t = u ‖a v, with u  A0 ∨ A1 and for all numerals n,
v[a := n]  A0 ∨ A1. If t
′ = u or t′ = v[a := m], we are done. If t′ = u′ ‖a v, with
u 7→ u′, then by induction hypothesis, u′  A0 ∨A1. So u
′ ‖a v  A0 ∨A1 by deVnition.
If t′ = u ‖a v
′, with v 7→ v′, then for every numeral n, v[a := n] 7→ v′[a := n] and thus by
induction hypothesis v′[a := n]  A0 ∨A1. So u ‖a v
′
 A0 ∨A1 by deVnition.
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(CR3) and (CR4) are trivial.
(CR5). By induction hypothesis (CR5), there is a term u such that u  A0. Thus ι0(u) 
A0 ∨A1.
• C = ∃αNA. Similar to the case t = A0 ∨A1.
This Vrst property can be used in order to state a Vrst result on the meaning of realizers: if we
denote by EM[u] a term of the form ((u ‖ v1) ‖ v2) . . .) ‖ vn for any n ≥ 0, then
Proposition 2 (Weak Disjunction and Numerical Existence Properties).
1. Suppose t  A ∨ B. Then either t 7→∗ EM[ι0(u)] and u  A or t 7→
∗ EM[ι1(u)] and
u  B.
2. Suppose t  ∃αNA. Then t 7→∗ EM[(n, u)] for some numeral n such that u  A[n/α].
Proof.
1. Since t ∈ SN by (CR1), let t′ be such that t 7→∗ t′ ∈ NF. By (CR2), t′  A ∨ B. If
t′ = ι0(u), we are done. The only possibility left is that t
′ = v ‖ v1 ‖ v2 . . . ‖ vn, with v
not of the form w0 ‖ w1. By deVnition 5.4.(ii) we have v  A ∨ B, and since v is normal
and not of the form w0 ‖ w1, by deVnition 5.4.(i) we have either v = ι0(u), with u  A,
or v = ι1(u), with u  B.
2. Similar to 1.
Informally, this means that a realizer of a disjunction “contains” a realizer of one of the
disjuncts, and a realizer of an existential statement similarly contains a witness. However, these
realizers might rely on universal assumptions. We can specialize this theorem in the case of
simpler existential formulas:
Theorem 1 (Existential Witness Extraction). Suppose t is closed, t  ∃αNP and t 7→∗ t′ ∈ NF.
Then t′ = (n, u) for some numeral n such that P[n/α] ≡ True.
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Proof. By proposition 2, there is some numeral n such that t′ = EM[(n, u)] and u  P[n/α].
So
t′ = (n, u) ‖a1 v1 ‖a2 v2 . . . ‖am vm
Since t′ is closed, u is quasi-closed and all its free variables are among a1, a2, . . . , am. We
observe that u must be closed. Otherwise, by deVnition 5.1.(i) and u  P[n/α] we deduce
that u ∈ PNF, and thus u should contain a subterm H∀αQai n; moreover, Q[n/α] ≡ False oth-
erwise u would not be normal; but then we would have either m 6= 0 and t′ /∈ NF because
t′ 7→ v1[a1 := n] ‖a2 v2 . . . ‖am vm, or m = 0 and t
′ non-closed. Since u is closed, we obtain
t′ = (n, u), for otherwise t′ 7→ (n, u) ‖a2 v2 . . . ‖am vm and t
′ /∈ NF. Since u  P[n/α], by
deVnition 5.1.(i) it must be P[n/α] ≡ True.
We now come to the main theorem, the soundness of the realizability semantics:
Theorem 2 (Adequacy Theorem). Suppose that Γ ⊢ w : A in the system HA + EM1, with
Γ = x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, a1 : ∃α
N
1P
⊥
1 , . . . , am : ∃α
N
mP
⊥
m, b1 : ∀α
N
1Q1, . . . , bl : ∀α
N
l Ql
and that the free variables of the formulas occurring in Γ and A are among α1, . . . , αk . For all
closed terms r1, . . . , rk of L, if there are terms t1, . . . , tn such that
for i = 1, . . . , n, ti  Ai[r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
then
w[t1/x1 · · · tn/xn r1/α1 · · · rk/αk a1 := i1 · · · am := im]  A[r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
for every numerals i1, . . . , im.
Before proving this theorem, we need an auxiliary lemma
Lemma 1.
1. If for every t  A, u[t/x]  B, then λxu  A→ B.
2. If for every closed termm of L, u[m/α]  B[m/α], then λαu  ∀αNB.
3. If u  A0 and v  A1, then pii〈u, v〉  Ai.
4. If w0[x0.u0, x1.u1]  C and for all numerals n, w1[x0.u0, x1.u1][a := n]  C , then
(w0 ‖a w1)[x0.u0, x1.u1]  C .
5. If t  A0 ∨A1 and for every ti  Ai it holds ui[ti/xi]  C , then t[x0.u0, x1.u1]  C .
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6. If t  ∃αNA and for every term n of L and v  A[n/α] it holds u[n/α][v/x]  C , then
t[(α, x).u]  C .
Proof of lemma 1.
1. As in [GTL89].
2. As in [GTL89].
3. As in [GTL89].
4. We may assume a does not occur in u0, u1. By hypothesis, w0[x0.u0, x1.u1]  C and for
every numeral n,w1[x0.u0, x1.u1][a := n]  C . By (CR1), in order to showw0 ‖a w1[x0.u0, x1.u1] 
C , we may proceed by induction on the sum of the sizes of the reduction trees ofw0, w1, u0, u1.
By (CR3), it then suXces to assume that w0 ‖a w1[x0.u0, x1.u1] 7→ z and show z  C .
If z = w0[x0.u0, x1.u1] or w1[a := n][x0.u0, x1.u1] for some numeral n, we are done. If
z = w′0 ‖a w1[x0.u0, x1.u1] or z = w0 ‖a w
′
1[x0.u0, x1.u1] or z = w0 ‖a w1[x0.u
′
0, x1.u1]
or z = w0 ‖a w1[x0.u0, x1.u
′
1], with wi 7→ w
′
i and ui 7→ u
′
i, then by (CR2) we can apply
the induction hypothesis and obtain z  C . If
z = (w0[x0.u0, x1.u1]) ‖a (w1[x0.u0, x1.u1])
then z  C by (CR4).
5. Suppose t  A0 ∨ A1 and for every ti  Ai it holds ui[ti/xi]  C . In order to show
t[x0.u0, x1.u1]  C , we reason by induction of the deVnition of t  A0 ∨ A1. Since by
(CR5) there are v0, v1 such that vi  Ai, we have ui[vi/xi]  Ai, and thus by (CR1),
ui[vi/xi] ∈ SN and t ∈ SN. We have three cases:
• t = ιi(u). Then u  Ai. Wewant to show that for every u
′
 Ai, ι0(u
′)[x0.u0, x1.u1] 
C . By (CR3), it suXces to assume that ι0(u)[x0.u0, x1.u1] 7→ z and show z  C .
We reason by induction on the sum of the sizes of the reduction trees of u, u0, u1. If
z = ιi(u
′)[x0.u0, x1.u1] or z = t[x0.u
′
0, x1.u1] or z = t[x0.u0, x1.u
′
1], with u 7→ u
′
and ui 7→ u
′
i, then by (CR2) we can apply the induction hypothesis and obtain
z  C . If z = ui[u/xi], since u  Ai, we obtain z  C .
• t = w0 ‖a w1. By induction hypothesis w0[x0.u0, x1.u1]  C and for all numerals
n, w1[a := n][x0.u0, x1.u1]  C . By 4., w0 ‖a w1[x0.u0, x1.u1]  C .
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• t /∈ NF is neutral. We reason by induction on the sum of the sizes of the reduction
trees of u0, u1. By (CR3), it suXces to assume that t[x0.u0, x1.u1] 7→ z and show
z  C . If z = t′[x0.u0, x1.u1], we apply the (main) induction hypothesis and obtain
z  C . If z = t[x0.u
′
0, x1.u1] or z = t[x0.u0, x1.u
′
1], with u 7→ u
′ and ui 7→ u
′
i, then
by (CR2) we can apply the induction hypothesis and obtain z  C .
6. Analogous to 5.
Proof. Proof of the Adequacy Theorem
Notation: for any term v and formula B, we denote
v[t1/x1 · · · tn/xn r1/α1 · · · rk/αk a1 := i1 · · · am := im]
with v and
B[r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
with B. We proceed by induction on w . Consider the last rule in the derivation of Γ ⊢ w : A:
1. If it is the rule Γ ⊢ H
∀αjPj
bj
: ∀αNjPj , then w = H
∀αjPj
bj
and A = ∀αNjPj . So w = H
∀αjPj
bj
. Let
n be any closed term of L. We must show that wn  Pj [n/αj ]. We have H
∀αjPj
bj
n ∈ SN;
moreover, if H
∀αjPj
bj
n 7→ z, then z is True and Pj [n/αj ] ≡ True, and thus z  Pj [n/αj ];
if H∀αjPjn ∈ NF, then Pj [n/αj ] ≡ False. We conclude H
∀αjPj
bj
 ∀αNjPj = A.
2. If it is the rule Γ ⊢ W
∃αjPj
⊥
aj : ∃α
N
jP
⊥
j , then w = W
∃αjPj
⊥
aj and A = ∃α
N
jP
⊥
j . We have two
possibilities. i) w = (ij , True) and Pj[ij/αj ] ≡ False. But this means that w  ∃α
N
jPj
⊥
.
ii) w = (ij , H
∀αα=0
aj
S0). Again, w  ∃αNjPj
⊥
.
3. If it is a ∨-I rule, say left (the other case is symmetric), then w = ι0(u), A = B ∨ C and
Γ ⊢ u : B. So, w = ι0(u). By induction hypothesis u  B and thus u ∈ SN. We conclude
ι0(u)  B ∨ C = A.
4. If it is a ∨-E rule, then
w = u[x.w1, y.w2]
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and Γ ⊢ u : B∨C , Γ, x : B ⊢ w1 : D, Γ, y : C ⊢ w2 : D,A = D. By induction hypothesis,
we have u  B ∨ C; moreover, for every t  B, we have w1[t/x]  B and for every
t  C, we have w2[t/y]  C . By lemma 1, we obtain w = u[x.w1, y.w2]  D.
5. The cases ∃-I and ∃-E are similar respectively to ∨-I and ∨-E.
6. If it is the ∀-E rule, then w = ut, A = B[t/α] and Γ ⊢ u : ∀αNB. So, w = ut. By inductive
hypothesis u  ∀αNB and so ut  B[t/α].
7. If it is the ∀-I rule, then w = λαu, A = ∀αNB and Γ ⊢ u : B (with α not occurring free
in the formulas of Γ). So, w = λαu, since we may assume α 6= α1, . . . , αk . Let t be any
closed term of L; by lemma 1), it is enough to prove that u[t/α]  B[t/α], which amounts
to show that the induction hypothesis can be applied to u. For this purpose, we observe
that, since α 6= α1, . . . , αk , for i = 1, . . . , n we have
ti  Ai = Ai[t/α]
8. If it is the induction rule, then w = Ruvt, A = B(t), Γ ⊢ u : B(0) and Γ ⊢ v :
∀αN.B(α)→ B(S(α)). So, w = Ruvl, for some numeral l = t.
We prove that for all numerals n, Ruvn  B(n). By (CR3), it is enough to suppose
that Ruvn 7→ w and show that w  B(n). By induction hypothesis u  B(0) and
vm  B(m) → B(S(m)) for all closed terms m of L. So by (CR1), we can reason by
induction on the sum of the sizes of reduction trees of u and v and the size ofm. If n = 0
and w = u, then we are done. If n = S(m) and w = vm(Ruvm), by induction hypothesis
Ruvm  B(m); therefore, w  B(Sm). If w = Ru′vm, with u 7→ u′, by induction
hypothesis w  B(m). We conclude the same if w = Ruv′m, with v 7→ v′.
We thus obtain that w  B(l) = B(t).
9. If it is the EM1 rule, then w = u ‖a v, Γ, a : ∀α
NP ⊢ u : C and Γ, a : ∃αNP⊥ ⊢ v : C and
A = C . By induction hypothesis, u  C and for all numerals m, v[a := m]  C. By
(CR4), we conclude w = u ‖a v  C.
10. If it is a Post rule, the case w is True is trivial, so we may assume w = rt1 . . . tn, A = P and
Γ ⊢ t1 : P1, . . . ,Γ ⊢ tn : Pn. By induction hypothesis, for i = 1, . . . , n, we have ti  Pi.
By (CR1), we can argue by induction on the size of the reduction tree of w. We have
two cases. i) w ∈ NF. For i = 1, . . . , n, by Theorem 1, we obtain ti ∈ PNF. Therefore,
also w ∈ PNF. Assume now P ≡ False. Then, for some i, Pi ≡ False. Therefore, ti
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contains a subterm [a]H∀αQn with Q[n/α] ≡ False and thus also w. We conclude w  P.
ii) w /∈ NF. By (CR3), it is enough to suppose w 7→ z and show z  P. We have
z = rt1 . . . t
′
i . . . tn, with ti 7→ t
′
i, and by (CR2), t
′
i  Pi. By induction hypothesis, z  P.
As an easy corollary, we get strong normalization of the system
Corollary (Strong Normalization of HA+EM1). All terms of HA+EM1 are strongly normalizing.
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Grammar of Untyped Terms
t, u, v ::= x | tu | tm | λxu | λαu | 〈t, u〉 | pi0u | pi1u | ι0(u) | ι1(u) | (m, t) |t[x.u, y.v] | t[(α, x).u]
| u ‖a v | H
∀αP
a | W
∃αP⊥
a | True | Ruvm | rt1 . . . tn
where m ranges over terms of L, x over variables of the lambda calculus and a over EM1
hypothesis variables. Moreover, in terms of the form u ‖a v there is a P such that all the
free occurrences of a in u are of the form H∀αPa and those in v are of the form W
∃αP⊥
a .
Contexts With Γ we denote contexts of the form e1 : A1, . . . , en : An, where ei is either a
proof-term variable x, y, z . . . or a EM1 hypothesis variable a, b, . . .
Axioms Γ, x : A ⊢ x : A Γ, a : ∀αNP ⊢ H∀αPa : ∀α
NP Γ, a : ∃αNP⊥ ⊢ W∃αP
⊥
a : ∃α
NP⊥
Conjunction
Γ ⊢ u : A Γ ⊢ t : B
Γ ⊢ 〈u, t〉 : A ∧B
Γ ⊢ u : A ∧B
Γ ⊢ pi0u : A
Γ ⊢ u : A ∧B
Γ ⊢ pi1u : B
Implication
Γ ⊢ t : A→ B Γ ⊢ u : A
Γ ⊢ tu : B
Γ, x : A ⊢ u : B
Γ ⊢ λxu : A→ B
Disjunction Intro.
Γ ⊢ u : A
Γ ⊢ ι0(u) : A ∨B
Γ ⊢ u : B
Γ ⊢ ι1(u) : A ∨B
Disjunction Elim.
Γ ⊢ u : A ∨B Γ, x : A ⊢ w1 : C Γ, x : B ⊢ w2 : C
Γ ⊢ u[x.w1, x.w2] : C
Universal QuantiVcation
Γ ⊢ u : ∀αNA
Γ ⊢ ut : A[t/α]
Γ ⊢ u : A
Γ ⊢ λαu : ∀αNA
where t is a term of the language L and α does not occur free in any formula B occurring
in Γ.
Existential QuantiVcation
Γ ⊢ u : A[t/α]
Γ ⊢ (t, u) : ∃αN.A
Γ ⊢ u : ∃αNA Γ, x : A ⊢ t : C
Γ ⊢ u[(α, x).t] : C
where α is not free in C nor in any formula B occurring in Γ.
Induction
Γ ⊢ u : A(0) Γ ⊢ v : ∀αN.A(α)→ A(S(α))
Γ ⊢ Ruvm : A[m/α]
Post Rules
Γ ⊢ u1 : A1 Γ ⊢ u2 : A2 · · · Γ ⊢ un : An
Γ ⊢ u : A
whereA1, A2, . . . , An, A are atomic formulas of HA and the rule is a Post rule for equality,
for a Peano axiom or for a classical propositional tautology or for booleans and if n > 0,
u = ru1 . . . un, otherwise u = True.
EM1
Γ, a : ∀αNP ⊢ w1 : C Γ, a : ∃α
NP⊥ ⊢ w2 : C
Γ ⊢ w1 ‖a w2 : C
Figure 3.2: Term Assignment Rules for HA + EM1
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Reduction Rules for HA
(λx.u)t 7→ u[t/x] (λα.u)t 7→ u[t/α]
pii〈u0, u1〉 7→ ui, for i=0,1
ιi(u)[x1.t1, x2.t2] 7→ ti[u/xi], for i=0,1
(n, u)[(α, x).v] 7→ v[n/α][u/x], for each numeral n
Ruv0 7→ u
Ruv(Sn) 7→ vn(Ruvn), for each numeral n
Permutation Rules for em1
(u ‖a v)w 7→ uw ‖a vw
pii(u ‖a v) 7→ piiu ‖a piiv
(u ‖a v)[x.w1, y.w2] 7→ u[x.w1, y.w2] ‖a v[x.w1, y.w2]
(u ‖a v)[(α, x).w] 7→ u[(α, x).w] ‖a v[(α, x).w]
Reduction Rules for em1
u ‖a v 7→ u, if a does not occur free in u
u ‖a v 7→ v[a := n], if H
∀αP
a n occurs in u and P[n/α] is closed and P[n/α] = False
(H∀αPa )n 7→ True if P[n/α] is closed and P[n/α] ≡ True
Figure 3.3: Reduction Rules for HA + EM1
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CHAPTER 4
Markov’s principle in HA + EM1
In the previous chapters we have developed the basic tools for understanding Curry-Howard
systems and realizability semantics. In this chapter, we will perform a deeper analysis of the
system HA + EM1, and propose a restricted version (that we will call HA + EM
−
1 ) that gains
more properties. In particular, we will prove a subject reduction theorem and then use it in order
to show that the restricted system satisVes the requirements of constructive logic: whenever we
prove a disjunction we are able to prove one of the disjuncts, and whenever we prove a simply
existential statement, we are able to exhibit a witness. Finally, we will show that Markov’s prin-
ciple is provable in this restricted system and that it has a realizer that exhibits its computational
content; moreover, we will show that Markov’s principle is equivalent to the restricted form of
excluded middle we have introduced.
Consider the system HA + EM1 of [ABB13] presented in section 3.3. We modify the rule em1
by restricting it to the case where the conclusion is of the form ∃xC with C an atomic formula:
Γ,∀xP ⊢ ∃xC Γ,∃xP⊥ ⊢ ∃xC
em−1Γ ⊢ ∃xC
We call this new rule em−1 .
4.1 Subject reduction for HA + EM−1
The subject reduction property asserts that whenever a proof term has a certain type, and it gets
reduced a certain number of times, the reduced term will have the same type. When types are
taken to correspond to formulas, subject reduction gives us two very important facts:
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• From the paradigmatic point of view, it connects the concepts of proof normalization and
computation. Reduction rules for the proof terms are usually direct simulations of proof
normalization steps. If the system does enjoy the subject reduction property, we can eUec-
tively identify these two notions.
• From a proof-theoretic point of view, when it is added to an adequate realizability inter-
pretation it enables one to draw conclusions on the logical system based on the behaviour
of the proof terms. A crucial example of this is given in section 4.2.
More formally, we can write
DeVnition 7 (Subject reduction). A system enjoys subject reduction if whenever Γ ⊢M : τ and
M 7→∗ N , then also Γ ⊢ N : τ
In [ABB13] it is mentioned that system HA + EM1 has the subject reduction property, how-
ever the result is not proved. Moreover, classic textbooks such as [SU06] only oUer a full proof
for simply typed systems (i.e. where the only set of rules is→-I and→-E). We shall now give a
detailed proof for the system HA + EM−1 .
We Vrst need two preliminary lemmas, similar to the ones presented in [SU06] but extended
for our new rules. The main one is the Generation Lemma, that given a typed term will allow us
to talk about the terms and types used in its type derivation. Then we will need to make sure
that substitutions (both ordinary and the witness substitution we have previously deVned) do not
aUect typing of a term.
Lemma 2 (Generation Lemma). Suppose Γ ⊢ t : τ .
(i) If t is of the form λx.u and x 6∈ dom(Γ), then τ = τ1 → τ2 and Γ, x : τ1 ⊢ u : τ2
(ii) If t is of the form uv, then Γ ⊢ u : σ → τ and Γ ⊢ v : σ for some σ
(iii) If t is of the form λα.u and α is not free in Γ then τ = ∀αNσ and Γ ⊢ u : σ
(iv) If t is of the form um, wherem is a term in L, then τ = σ[m/α], and Γ ⊢ u : ∀αNσ.
(v) If t is of the form u[x.w1, x.w2], then there are τ1,τ2 such that Γ ⊢ u : τ1 ∨ τ2, Γ, x : τ1 ⊢
w1 : τ , Γ, x : τ2 ⊢ w2 : τ
(vi) If t is of the form ιi(u), then τ = τ1 ∨ τ2 and Γ ⊢ u : τi
(vii) If t is of the form 〈u, v〉, then τ = τ1 ∧ τ2 and Γ ⊢ u : τ1, Γ ⊢ v : τ2
(viii) If t is of the form pii(u), then Γ ⊢ u : τ ∧ σ or Γ ⊢ u : σ ∧ τ (resp. if i = 1 or 2)
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(ix) If t is of the form u[(α, x).v], where α is not free in τ and Γ, then there is σ such that
Γ, x : σ ⊢ v : τ and Γ ⊢ u : ∃αN.σ
(x) If t is of the form (m,u), then τ = ∃αN.τ1 and Γ ⊢ u : τ1[m/α]
(xi) If t is of the form Ruvm, then τ = σ(m), Γ ⊢ u : σ(0), Γ ⊢ v : ∀αN.σ(α)→ σ(Sα)
(xii) If t is of the form [a]H∀αP, then Γ ⊢ [a]H∀αP : ∀αNP and Γ ⊢ a : ∀αNP
(xiii) If t is of the form u ‖a v, then Γ, a : ∀α
NP ⊢ u : τ and Γ, a : ∃αNP⊥ ⊢ v : τ . Moreover,
τ = ∃αP.
Proof. Consider for example the case of t = λx.u. Then since the term has a type, the type
derivation must end with the →-introduction rule. Then it follows that τ = τ1 → τ2 and
Γ, x : τ1 ⊢ u : τ2. The other cases are similar.
Lemma 3 (Substitution preserves types).
(i) If Γ ⊢ u : τ and Γ(x) = Γ′(x) for all x free in u, then Γ′ ⊢ u : τ
(ii) If Γ, x : σ ⊢ u : τ and Γ ⊢ t : σ, then Γ ⊢ u[t/x] : τ
(iii) If Γ ⊢ u : τ ,m ∈ L, then Γ[m/α] ⊢ u[m/α] : τ [m/α]
Proof.
(i) By induction on the structure of u. The base case is straightforward.
Consider u of the form λyv. We can rename variable y in a way such that it is not free
in Γ ∪ Γ′. Then, τ = τ1 → τ2 by lemma 2 and Γ, y : τ1 ⊢ v : τ2. From the induction
hypothesis, Γ′, y : τ1 ⊢ v : τ2 and using an implication introduction Γ
′ ⊢ v : τ . Other cases
are analogous.
(ii) By induction on the structure of u.
• Base case: assume u = y is a variable. Then if y = x, τ = σ and u[t/x] = t; if y 6= x,
then the thesis follows from the Vrst point.
If u is a em−1 hypothesis, the thesis follows from the Vrst point.
• If u = λyv, then we can assume, by (i), that y 6= x and y does not occur in Γ. By
the generation lemma we have τ = τ1 → τ2 and Γ, x : σ, y : τ1 ⊢ v : τ2. By the
induction hypothesis Γ, y : τ1 ⊢ v[t/x] : τ2 and applying implication introduction
Γ ⊢ λyv[t/x] : τ1 → τ2 = τ
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• If u = vw, then by the generation lemma Γ ⊢ v : σ → τ and Γ ⊢ w : σ for some
σ. Then by the induction hypothesis Γ ⊢ v[t/x] : σ → τ and Γ ⊢ w[t/x] : σ and
applying the implication elimination rule Γ ⊢ v[t/x]w[t/x] : τ . By the deVnition of
substitution this also means Γ ⊢ vw[t/x] : τ .
• If u = ιi(v), then by lemma 2 τ = τ1 ∨ τ2 and Γ ⊢ v : τi. By the induction hypothesis,
Γ ⊢ v[t/x] : τi and using the disjunction introduction rule Γ ⊢ ιi(v[t/x]) : τi. By
deVnition of substitution this also means Γ ⊢ ιi(v)[t/x] : τi
• If u = v[y.w1, y.w2], then by lemma 2 there are τ1,τ2 such that Γ, x : σ ⊢ v : τ1 ∨ τ2,
Γ, x : σ, y : τ1 ⊢ w1 : τ , Γ, x : σ, y : τ2 ⊢ w2 : τ . We can apply the induction
hypothesis on all these terms and get Γ ⊢ v[t/x] : τ1 ∨ τ2, Γ, y : τ1 ⊢ w1[t/x] : τ ,
Γ, y : τ2 ⊢ w2[t/x] : τ . Then, using the disjunction elimination rule we obtain
Γ ⊢ v[t/x][y.w1[t/x], y.w2[t/x]] : τ1 ∨ τ2, which by deVnition of substitution is the
same as Γ ⊢ (v[y.w1, y.w2])[t/x] : τ1 ∨ τ2
The other cases are similar.
(iii) Again by induction on the structure of u.
• Base case: if u = x is a variable, if judgement x : τ is in Γ we have the judgement
x : τ [m/α] in Γ[m/α]. Similarly for the cases of H∀αPa and W
∃αP⊥
a
• If u = vn, then by lemma 2 τ = σ[n/β] and Γ ⊢ v : ∀βNσ. By induction hypothesis
Γ[m/α] ⊢ v[m/α] : ∀βNσ[m/α]. If α = β, then ∀βNσ[m/α] = ∀αNσ; by using univer-
sal elimination we have Γ[m/α] ⊢ v[m/α](n[m/α]) : σ[n[m/α]/α] = σ[n/α][m/α]
If α 6= β, then note that ∀βNσ[m/α] = ∀βN(σ[m/α]), and again using universal
elimination Γ[m/α] ⊢ v[m/α](n[m/α]) : σ[n[m/α]/β] = σ[n/β][m/α].
• If u = λβv then by lemma 2 β is not free in Γ, τ = ∀βNσ and Γ ⊢ v : σ.
Consider Vrst α 6= β. By induction hypothesis, Γ[m/α] ⊢ v[m/α] : σ[m/α]. Using
universal introduction (since by renaming of bound variable β is never free in Γ[m/α])
then Γ[m/α] ⊢ λβv[m/α] : σ[m/α][n/β], and σ[m/α][n/β] = σ[n/β][m/α] since
α 6= β.
Otherwise, if α = β, since β is not free in Γ, v and σ the result holds vacuosly.
The other cases are similar.
Lemma 4 (Witness substitution preserves type). If Γ ⊢ u : τ , then Γ ⊢ u[a := n] : τ
Proof. Direct consequence of lemma 3 (ii)
We are now ready to state the main result for this section:
38
4.1. Subject reduction for HA + EM−1
Theorem 3. HA + EM−1 has the subject reduction property
Proof. Assume Γ ⊢ t : τ and t 7→β t
′. Proceed by structural induction on the beta reduction.
Reduction rules for HA:
• t = (λx.u)v : τ and t 7→ u[v/x]. By the generation lemma, Γ ⊢ (λx.u) : σ → τ and
Γ ⊢ v : σ for some σ. Again by generation lemma, Γ, x : σ ⊢ u : τ . Therefore by lemma 3,
Γ ⊢ u[v/x] : τ .
• t = (λα.u)v and t 7→ u[v/α]. By the generation lemma, τ = τ1[v/α], and Γ ⊢ u : ∀α
Nτ1.
Again by Generation, Γ ⊢ u : τ1, and by lemma 3, Γ ⊢ u[v/α] : τ1[v/α]
• t = pii〈u0, u1〉 and t 7→ ui. Then by lemma 2 Γ ⊢ 〈u0, u1〉 : τi ∧ τ1−i (with τ0 = τ ), and
again by lemma 2 Γ ⊢ u0 : τi and Γ ⊢ u1 : τ1−i. Then for i = 0, 1 we have Γ ⊢ ui : τ0 = τ
• t = ιi(u)[x1.t1, x2.t2] and t 7→ ti[u/xi]. By lemma 2 there are τ1 and τ2 such that Γ ⊢
ιi(u) : τ1 ∨ τ2, Γ, x : τ1 ⊢ t1 : τ and Γ, x : τ2 ⊢ t2 : τ . Again by lemma 2, Γ ⊢ u : τi, and
by lemma 3 Γ ⊢ ti[u/xi] : τ
• t = (n, u)[(α, x).v] and t 7→ v[n/α][u/x], where α is not free in Γ ∪ {t : τ}. By lemma 2,
there is a σ such that Γ, x : σ ⊢ v : τ and Γ ⊢ (n, u) : ∃αN.σ. Again by lemma 2,
Γ ⊢ u : σ[n/α]. Using lemma 3 and the fact that α is not free in Γ and τ , we can write
Γ, x : σ[n/α] ⊢ v[n/α] : τ ; Vnally, again by lemma 3, Γ ⊢ v[n/α][u/x] : τ
Rules for induction
• t = Ruv0 and t 7→ u. By lemma 2, τ = σ(0) and Γ ⊢ u : σ(0).
• t = Ruv(Sn) and t 7→ vn(Ruvn). By lemma 2, τ = σ(Sn), Γ ⊢ u : σ(0) and Γ ⊢
v : ∀αN.σ(α) → σ(Sα). In addition, by generation lemma on the term Ruvn we have
Γ ⊢ Ruvn : σ1(n) and Γ ⊢ u : σ1(0). Therefore σ1 = σ. Using the universal quantiVcation
rule on v we get Γ ⊢ vn : σ(n) → σ(Sn). Using the implication elimination rule on this
and Ruvn, we get Γ ⊢ vn(Ruvn) : σ(Sn)
Reduction rules for em−1 (there is no diUerence with the case of em1 ):
• Γ ⊢ ([a]H∀αP)n : τ and ([a]H∀αP)n 7→ True. By the generation lemma, Γ ⊢ [a]H∀αP : ∀αNP
and also Γ ⊢ [a]H∀αP : ∀αNτ1 and τ = τ1[m/α]. Therefore P = τ1, and by the condition of
the rewrite rule τ = P[m/α] = True.
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• Γ ⊢ u ‖a v : τ and u ‖a v 7→ u. Then by the generation lemma we have Γ, a : ∀α
NP ⊢ u :
τ . But a is not free in u by deVnition of the reduction rule, and so Γ ⊢ u : τ
• Γ ⊢ u ‖a v : τ and u ‖a v 7→ v[a := n]. From lemma 2 Γ, a : ∃α
N¬P ⊢ v : τ . From
lemma 4, Γ, a : ∃αN¬P ⊢ v[a := n] : τ . Since there are no free occurences of a in
v[a := n], Γ ⊢ v[a := n] : τ .
Permutation rules for em−1 :
• t = (u ‖a v)w and t 7→ uw ‖a vw, where a does not occur free in w. From the generation
lemma, Γ ⊢ u ‖a v : σ → τ and Γ ⊢ w : σ for some σ. Again by generation, Γ, a : ∀α
NP ⊢
u : σ → τ and Γ, a : ∃αNP⊥ ⊢ v : σ → τ . Applying implication elimination rule to both
terms, and then em−1 , we get Γ ⊢ uw ‖a vw : τ
• t = (u ‖a v)[x.w1, y.w2] and t 7→ u[x.w1, y.w2] ‖a v[x.w1, y.w2] . From lemma 2 there are
τ1, τ2 s.t Γ ⊢ u ‖a v : τ1∨τ2 and Γ, x : τ1 ⊢ w1 : τ , Γ, x : τ2 ⊢ w2 : τ . From lemma 2 again,
Γ, a : ∀αNP ⊢ u : τ1 ∨ τ2 and Γ, a : ∃α
NP⊥ ⊢ v : τ1 ∨ τ2. Using disjunction elimination on
both terms, followed by em−1 , we get Γ ⊢ u[x.w1, y.w2] ‖a v[x.w1, y.w2] : τ .
• Cases pii(u ‖a v) 7→ piiu ‖a piiv and (u ‖a v)[(α, x).w] 7→ u[(α, x).w] ‖a v[(α, x).w] are
similar to the previous points.
4.2 Disjunction and existential properties
The subject reduction theorem we have just proved ensures that, whenever we reduce a proof
term with one of the reduction rules, we will obtain another proof term of the same type. This,
combined with Theorem 2 (the adequacy theorem), allows us to draw conclusions on the be-
haviour of the logical system based on the behaviour of the proof terms. Such tools will be
employed now to prove two important constructive properties of the system HA + EM−1 .
Let’s Vrst recall the two main theorems we have seen in section 3.4 (the proofs can easily
adapted to the new system HA + EM−1 .)
Theorem 1 (Existential Witness Extraction). Suppose t is closed, t  ∃αNP and t 7→∗ t′ ∈ NF.
Then t′ = (n, u) for some numeral n such that P[n/α] ≡ True.
Although this theorem only talks about Σ01 formulas, this is enough for the purpose of prov-
ing the constructivity of HA + EM−1 . Indeed, this is the only kind of existential statement that
we are allowed to prove with our rule. In order to use the properties of the realizers to talk about
the logic system, we will need the adequacy theorem:
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Theorem 2 (Adequacy Theorem). Suppose that Γ ⊢ w : A in the system HA + EM1, with
Γ = x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, a1 : ∃α
N
1P
⊥
1 , . . . , am : ∃α
N
mP
⊥
m, b1 : ∀α
N
1Q1, . . . , bl : ∀α
N
l Ql
and that the free variables of the formulas occurring in Γ and A are among α1, . . . , αk . For all
closed terms r1, . . . , rk of L, if there are terms t1, . . . , tn such that
for i = 1, . . . , n, ti  Ai[r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
then
w[t1/x1 · · · tn/xn r1/α1 · · · rk/αk a1 := i1 · · · am := im]  A[r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
for every numerals i1, . . . , im.
Combining these theorems with the new subject reduction theorem, we can now state
Theorem 4 (Disjunction property). Suppose ⊢ t : A ∨ B in the system HA + EM−1 where t and
A ∨B are closed. Then there exists a term u s.t. ⊢ u : A or a term v s.t. ⊢ v : A
Proof. If t is not in normal form take t′ such that t 7→∗ t′, and t′ is in normal form. By Theorem 3,
⊢ t′ : A ∨ B, and then by the adequacy theorem t′  A ∨ B. Consider now the possible cases
by the deVnition of realizer:
• If t′ = ιi(u), from lemma 2 we have that ⊢ u : A or ⊢ u : B resp. when i = 0, 1.
• If t′ = u ‖a v, then by lemma 2 we would have ⊢ t
′ : ∃αP for some atomic P, but this
contradicts the fact that ⊢ t′ : A ∨B; so this case cannot be possible.
• Since t′ is already in normal form, the third case cannot be possible.
With a very similar argument, we have also
Theorem 5 (Existential property). Suppose ⊢ t : ∃αA in the system HA + EM−1 where t and ∃αA
are closed. Then there exists a numeral n and a term u s.t. ⊢ u : A[n/α]
Proof. By the adequacy theorem, t  ∃αA. Distinguish cases on the deVnition of the realizabil-
ity relation:
• If t = (n, u), then by the generation lemma ⊢ u : A[n/α]
• If t = u ‖a v, then by lemma 2 A is atomic. Let t
′ be such that t 7→∗ t′ ∈ NF; then,
by Theorem 1, t = (n, t′). By Theorem 3 ⊢ (n, t′) : ∃αA, and by lemma 2 we have
⊢ t′ : A[n/α].
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4.3 Rule em−1 is equivalent to Markov’s principle
The fundamental reason behind the constructive analysis of the system HA + EM−1 was its re-
semblance with Markov’s principle. The discussion we have done so far does not depend directly
on this; however, the fact that our system is indeed constructive (in the broader sense we have
used so far) provides even stronger evidence that the em−1 rule should be equivalent to Markov’s
principle.
Consider the usual system HA + EM−1 , and state Markov’s principle as the axiom mrk:
¬∀αP → ∃αP⊥. This gives a proof of the axiom:
[¬∀αP](1) [∀αP]em−
1
⊥
∃αP⊥ [∃αP⊥]em−
1
em−1
∃αP⊥
(1)
¬∀αP → ∃αP⊥
Conversely, consider the system HA plus the axiom mrk. We can obtain rule em−1 as follows:
assuming we have proofs
∀αP
...
∃αC
and
∃αP⊥
...
∃αC
build this proof of ∃αC :
[∀αC⊥](1)
[∀αP](2)
...
∃αC
D1
⊥ (2)
¬∀αP
[∀αC⊥](1)
[∃αP⊥](3)
...
∃αC
D1
⊥ (3)
¬∃αP⊥
D2
∀αP
⊥ (1)
¬∀αC⊥
mrk
¬∀αC⊥ → ∃αC
∃αC
Where D1 is given by
42
4.4. A realizer for Markov’s principle
∀αC⊥
C⊥(α) [C(α)]∃
⊥ ∃αC(α)
∃
⊥
And D2 is given by
P(α) ∨ P⊥(α) [P(α)]
∨-E
¬∃αP⊥(α)
[P⊥(α)](1)
∃αP⊥(α)
⊥ (1)
¬P⊥(α) [P⊥(α)]
∨-E
⊥
P(α)
∨-E
P(α)
∀αP(α)
Note that in the last proof we used the axiom P(α)∨P⊥(α) since P is atomic and thus decidable
in HA.
4.4 A realizer for Markov’s principle
Now that we have a proof tree for Markov’s principle in HA + EM−1 , we can decorate it in order
to get a realizer of the principle:
[x : ¬∀αB](2) [H
∀αB
a : ∀αB]em−
1
xH∀αBa : ⊥
rxH∀αBa : B
⊥[0/α]
(0, rxH∀αBa ) : ∃αB
⊥ [W∃αB
⊥
a : ∃αB
⊥]em−
1
em−1
(0, rxH∀αBa ) ‖a W
∃αB⊥
a : ∃αB
⊥
(1)
λx.((0, rxH∀αBa ) ‖a W
∃αB⊥
a ) : ¬∀αB → ∃αB
⊥
The extracted term fully exploits the properties of the system in order to get a more precise
computational meaning for Markov’s principle. When a realizer for ¬∀αB is given, it is applied
to the hypotetical term. Thus, the computation can proceed by using this assumption and reduc-
ing inside the left hand side of the proof term. At some point however, we are guaranteed that
the program will use the hypotesis on a termm for which B[m/α] does not hold. At this point,
an exception is raised and we gets the witness we were waiting for.
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CHAPTER 5
Further generalizations
In the previous section it was shown that Markov’s principle is equivalent to the excluded middle
restricted to Σ01 formulas and Σ
0
1 conclusions. However when taking a closer look at the formal
proof we gave, it can be noticed that the crucial use of Markov’s principle in proving this form
of the excluded middle is only done on the conclusion. The assumptions are only used in order
to obtain a contradiction and then do an ex falso reasoning. On the other side, we need Σ01
assumptions in order to be able to prove Markov’s principle.
Starting from this observation, we will prove that Markov’s principle is equivalent to a rule
allowing arbitrary excluded middle with Σ01 conclusions. After introducing this new rule, we
will try to use it in order to get a direct translation from proofs of classical arithmetic. We will
Vrst introduce the well established tool of negative translations and show how they succeed
in embedding classical reasoning inside intuitionistic systems. Then we will introduce a new
translation that, although missing the usual properties of negative translations, will be useful for
our scope when coupled with a set of proof transformation rules. Thanks to these two tools,
we will provide a way to transform classical proofs of simply existential formulas into proofs in
HA + EM−1 .
We will consider again the system HA of natural deduction for intuitionistic arithmetic, and
the HA+EM−1 extension we have already studied. When referring to classical proofs, or proofs in
Peano Arithmetic PA, we mean proofs in HA+EM where we add to HA the rule of full excluded
middle:
Γ, A ⊢ C Γ,¬A ⊢ C
em
Γ ⊢ C
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5.1 Full excluded middle with restricted conclusions
Consider a system of natural deduction for intuitionistic arithmetic, to which we add restricted
classical reasoning in the form of rule em− :
Γ, A ⊢ ∃xP Γ,¬A ⊢ ∃xP
em−
Γ ⊢ ∃xP
That is, we allow to eliminate instances of the excluded middle for arbitrary formulas A, but
only if the conclusion is a Σ01 formula.
This deduction, similar to the one of the previous chapter, gives a proof of Markov’s principle
by using the excluded middle rule on the formula ∃αP⊥
[∃αP⊥]em−
[¬∀αP](1)
[¬∃αP⊥]em−
D
∀αP
⊥
∃αP⊥
em−
∃αP⊥
(1)
¬∀αP → ∃αP⊥
Where D is, as in the previous section,
P(α) ∨ P⊥(α) [P(α)]
∨-E
¬∃αP⊥(α)
[P⊥(α)](1)
∃αP⊥(α)
⊥ (1)
¬P⊥(α) [P⊥(α)]
∨-E
⊥
P(α)
∨-E
P(α)
∀αP(α)
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Conversely, given a system of intuitionistic arithmetic HA with Markov’s principle as axiom
mrk: ¬∀αP → ∃αP⊥ we can obtain rule em− as follows: assuming we have proofs
A
...
∃αP
and
¬A
...
∃αP
build this proof of ∃αP:
[∀αP⊥](1)
[¬A](2)
...
∃αP
D
⊥ (2)
¬¬A
[∀αP⊥](1)
[A](3)
...
∃αP
D
⊥ (3)
¬A
⊥ (1)
¬∀αP⊥
mrk
¬∀αP⊥ → ∃αP
∃αP
Where D is given by
∃αP(α)
∀αP⊥
P⊥(α) [P(α)]∃
⊥
∃
⊥
We have now a more general result than the one we had in the previous chapter: Markov’s
principle is equivalent to allowing instances of the excluded middle to be used as axioms if and
only if the conclusion of the ∨-elimination rule is a Σ01 formula. In one sense this tells us that
when conclusions are restricted to be Σ01, allowing premises of arbitrary complexity does not
allow us to prove more than what we could prove already with simply existential premises.
5.2 A new negative translation
Negative translations
Negative translations have been known for long time as a tool to embed classical reasoning into
intuitionistic logic. Essentially, they consist in a method to transform every formula provable in a
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classical theory in another formula that is equivalent in classical logic and that, although it is not
intuitionistically equivalent, is provable from the translated theory. The most prominent example
is probably the so called Gödel-Gentzen translation [Göd33], or also double negation translation.
It assigns to every formula F a formula FN deVned by induction on its structure:
• If F is atomic, FN = ¬¬ F
• (F1 ∧ F2)
N is FN1 ∧ F
N
2
• (F1 ∨ F2)
N is ¬(¬FN1 ∧ ¬F
N
2 )
• (F1 → F2)
N is FN1 → F
N
2
• (¬F )N is ¬FN
• (∀x F )N is ∀x FN
• (∃x F )N is ¬∀x ¬ FN
The following theorem states the result we anticipated informally:
Theorem 6 (Gödel-Gentzen translation). Let Γ = A0, . . . An be a set of formulas. ThenA1, . . . An ⊢
A0 is classically derivable if and only if A
N
1 , . . . A
N
n ⊢ A
N
0 is intuitionistically derivable.
For a complete discussion and a proof of this result, one may refer to [Tro73]. The translation
proves especially useful in the case of arithmetic, thanks to the following theorem
Theorem 7. For any formula A in the language of arithmetic, if PA ⊢ A then HA ⊢ AN
Proof. Thanks to Theorem 6, we already know that PA ⊢ A if and only if HAN ⊢ AN . What
we need to show is that if HAN ⊢ AN , then HA ⊢ AN . In order to do so, we need to prove the
translated axioms in HA. We know that HA ⊢ ((s = t)→ ¬¬(s = t))∧ (¬¬(s = t)→ (s = t)),
and therefore since the axioms for equality only use ∀ and→, their translation is easily equivalent
to the original axiom.
Consider the translation of an instance of the induction axiom:
(∀x(F (x)→ F (sx))→ F (0)→ ∀xF (x))N = ∀x(FN (x)→ FN (sx))→ FN (0)→ ∀xFN (x)
Since the second formula is just the instance of the axiom of induction for the formula FN , it is
provable in HA. Therefore, we can conclude that HA ⊢ HAN , and thus HA ⊢ AN
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The negative translation allows to embed all of classical arithmetic inside intuitionistic arith-
metic. However, the resulting statements often do not provide a clear computational interpreta-
tion: consider for example the translation of an existential statement: we obtain something of the
form ¬∀x¬F , and it is not clear how one could exctract a witness. For addressing this issues, one
needs another translation such as the A-translation of Friedman [Fri78]. Essentially, it consists in
replacing every atomic predicate P with P ∨A for an arbitrary formula A. When we combine it
with the Gödel translation, we obtain the following deVnition: given formulas F1, F2, A, where
no free variable of A is quantiVed in F1 or F2
• ¬AF1 = F1 → A, ⊥
A = A
• FA1 = ¬A¬AF1 if F1 is atomic
• (F1 ∧ F2)
A = FA1 ∧ F
A
2
• (F1 ∨ F2)
A = ¬A(¬AF
A
1 ∧ ¬AF
A
2 )
• (F1 → F2)
A = FA1 → F
A
2
• (∀x F1)
A = ∀x FA1
• (∃x F1)
A = ¬A∀x ¬AF
A
1
We can see that it behaves very similarly to the usual Gödel-Gentzen translation, but with
the addition that negation is parametrized by the formula A. With thechniques very similar to
those of Theorem 6 and 7 we have that if Γ ⊢ F in PA, then ΓA ⊢ FA in HA. However, the new
translation also allows for a major result for the constructive interpretation of some statements
of classical arithmetic:
Theorem 8 (Friedman). Let P be an atomic predicate. Then PA ⊢ ∃x P(x) if and only if HA ⊢
∃x P(x)
Proof. Suppose PA ⊢ ∃x P(x); then HA ⊢ (∃x P(x))A, i.e. HA ⊢ (∀x ¬A¬A¬AP(x)) → A.
Since it can be seen that ¬A¬A¬AF ⊣⊢ ¬AF in HA for all F , HA ⊢ (∀x ¬AP(x)) → A.
Now, since we can use any formula forA, we use ∃x P(x): in this way we get HA ⊢ ∀x (P(x)→
∃x P(x))→ ∃x P(x). Since the antecedent of the formula is provable, we get HA ⊢ ∃x P(x).
The ∃-translation
We will now introduce a new translation and consider it for statements of arithmetic. Like
the usual negative translations, it will have the property that translated formulas are classically
equivalent to the original ones, and that the translated axioms of arithmetic are intuitionistically
provable in HA. However, we will not immediately present a result linking classical provability
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and intuitionistic provability as we did before; indeed, the synctactic translation method pre-
sented here will be used in the next section together with a more proof-theoretic technique in
order to provide a new interpretation of the simply existential statements of classical arithmetic.
Our translation is particularly simple when compared with the usual ones. It leaves all logical
connectives untouched, except for the case of ∀, which is substituted by¬∃¬. Formally, we deVne
the translation ·∃ by induction on the structure of the formula:
• If F is atomic, F ∃ = F
• (F1 ∧ F2)
∃ is F ∃1 ∧ F
∃
2
• (F1 ∨ F2)
∃ is F ∃1 ∨ F
∃
2
• (F1 → F2)
∃ is F ∃1 → F
∃
2
• (∀x F )∃ is ¬∃x ¬F ∃
• (∃x F )∃ is ∃x F ∃
We know that ∀x A(x) is classically equivalent to ¬∃x ¬A(x) regardless of A, and thus we
can easily state that PA ⊢ PA∃ and PA∃ ⊢ PA. So it is also easy to see
Proposition 3. PA ⊢ F if and only if PA∃ ⊢ F ∃
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the derivation.
The question is a bit more complicated for intuitionistic arithmetic: in general, the trans-
lated formula is not intuitionistically equivalent to the original one. Nevertheless, we have the
following result:
Theorem 9. HA ⊢ HA∃. So, every formula provable in HA∃ is provable in HA
Proof. The axioms for equality and the deVnition of the successor are left untouched by the
translation. Consider now the translation of the axiom for induction for an arbitrary formula P :
(Ind)∃ = (P (0) ∧ (∀α (P (α)→ P (α+ 1)))→ ∀α P (α))∃ =
P (0) ∧ (¬∃α. ¬(P (α)→ P (α+ 1)))→ ¬∃α¬P (α)
The formal derivation in Vg. 5.1 gives a proof of this formula in HA. Therefore, we have that
HA ⊢ HA∃, and so also whenever HA∃ ⊢ F HA ⊢ F
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[p](1) : P (0) ∧ (¬∃α. ¬(P (α)→ P (α+ 1)))
pi1(p) : ¬∃α. ¬(P (α)→ P (α+ 1))
[v](5) : ¬¬P (α)
[u](6) : ¬P (α+ 1)
[y](7) : P (α)→ P (α+ 1) [z]8 : P (α)
yz : P (α+ 1)
u(yz) : ⊥
(8)
λz.u(yz) : ¬P (α)
v(λz.u(yz)) : ⊥
(7)
λy v(λz.u(yz)) : ¬(P (α)→ P (α+ 1))
〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉 : ∃α. ¬(P (α)→ P (α+ 1))
pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉) : ⊥
(6)
λu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉) : ¬¬P (α+ 1)
(5)
λvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉) : ¬¬P (α)→ ¬¬P (α+ 1)
λαλvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉) : ∀α(¬¬P (α)→ ¬¬P (α+ 1))
Figure 5.1: Proof of the inductive step (D1)
[q](2) : ∃α¬P (α)
[x](4) : ¬P (0)
[p](1) : P (0) ∧ (¬∃α. ¬(P (α)→ P (α+ 1)))
pi0(p) : P (0)
xpi0(p) : ⊥
(4)
λx.xpi0(p) : ¬¬P (0)
D1
λαλvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉) : ∀α(¬¬P (α) → ¬¬P (α+ 1))
Ind
λαR(α λx.xpi0(p) λαλvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉)) : ∀α¬¬P (α)
λαR(α λx.xpi0(p) λαλvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉))β : ¬¬P (β) [t](3)(∃) : ¬P (β)
(λα (R(α λx.xpi0(p) λαλvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉)))β)t : ⊥
(3) (∃-E)
q[(β, t).((λα (R(α λx.xpi0(p) λαλvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉)))β)t)] : ⊥
(2)
λq q[(β, t).((λα (R(α λx.xpi0(p) λαλvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉)))β)t)] : ¬∃α¬P (α)
(1)
λpλq q[(β, t).((λα (R(α λx.xpi0(p) λαλvλu.pi1(p)(〈α, λy v(λz.u(yz))〉)))β)t)] : P (0) ∧ (¬∃α. ¬(P (α)→ P (α+ 1)))→ ¬∃α¬P (α)
Figure 5.2: Proof of (Ind)∃ in HA
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5.3 Embedding classical proofs in HA + EM−
We go back now to the system HA + EM− deVned in section 5.1. Since in this new system
instances of the excluded middle are allowed on arbitrary formulas, we might be tempted to
investigate more on how much of a classical proof we can reconstruct in it. A Vrst approach can
be the following: in the case the statement to be proved is itself simply existential, we could allow
occurrences of the excluded middle rule whenever we are sure they are the lowermost infecences.
More formally, we introduce the notation
D1
∃αP
D2
∃αP . . .
Dn
∃αP
em−
∃αP
to indicate that D1, D2 . . .Dn are proofs of ∃αP not using em
− , possibly with open assump-
tions, and the conclusion is obtained by repeated usage of the em− rule on them (note that em−
is indeed used only on a Σ01 formula). Similarly deVne the same notation for em .
Then clearly the new construct for em− can be directly replaced by instances of Markov’s
principle using the proof tree from section 5.1. Our task for this section is thus to show that any
proof (in PA, i.e. HA + EM) of a simply existential statement can be rewritten into a proof in
HA + EM− of the above form.
In order to do so, we employ new permutation rules extending the ones deVned in [AZ16] to
move the use of classical reasoning below purely intuitionistic proofs. In general, we could have
an unrestricted use of the excluded middle, in the form of the rule em. For every intuitionistic
rule, one needs to move the classical rule below it:
→-introduction:
[A] [B](1)
...
C
[¬A] [B](1)
...
C em
C (1)
B → C
❀
[A] [B](1)
...
C (1)
B → C
[¬A] [B](2)
...
C (2)
B → C em
B → C
→-elimination/1:
[A]
...
B → C
[¬A]
...
B → C em
B → C
...
B
C
❀
[A]
...
B → C
...
B
C
[¬A]
...
B → C
...
B
C em
C
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→-elimination/2:
...
B → C
[A]
...
B
[¬A]
...
B em
B
C
❀
...
B → C
[A]
...
B
C
...
B → C
[¬A]
...
B
C em
C
∧-introduction/1:
[A]
...
B
[¬A]
...
B em
B
...
C
B ∧C
❀
[A]
...
B
...
C
B ∧ C
[¬A]
...
B
...
C
B ∧C em
B ∧ C
∧-introduction/2:
...
B
[A]
...
C
[¬A]
...
C em
C
B ∧ C
❀
...
B
[A]
...
C
B ∧ C
...
B
[¬A]
...
C
B ∧ C em
B ∧C
∧-elimination/1, ∧-elimination/2:
[A]
...
A1 ∧A2
[¬A]
...
A1 ∧A2 em
A1 ∧A2
Ai
❀
[A]
...
A1 ∧A2
Ai
[¬A]
...
A1 ∧A2
Ai em
Ai
And similarly for ∨-introduction, ∨-elimination.
∃-introduction:
[A]
...
B[m/α]
[¬A]
...
B[m/α]
em
B[m/α]
∃αB
❀
[A]
...
B[m/α]
∃αB
[¬A]
...
B[m/α]
∃αB em
∃αB
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∃-elimination/1:
[A]
...
∃αB
[¬A]
...
∃αB em
∃αB
[B]
...
C
C
❀
[A]
...
∃αB
[B]
...
C
C
[¬A]
...
∃αB
[B]
...
C
C em
C
∃-elimination/2:
...
∃αB
[A] [B]
...
C
[¬A] [B]
...
C em
C
C
❀
...
∃αB
[A] [B]
...
C
C
...
∃αB
[¬A] [B]
...
C
C em
C
Now, we would like to deVne a permutation for the case of the universal quantiVer. However,
it turns out that this is not possible: for the case of ∀-I we have no general way of deVning one.
Consider for example the proof
[P (x)]em
(P (x) ∨ ¬P (x))
[¬P (x)]em
(P (x) ∨ ¬P (x))
em
(P (x) ∨ ¬P (x))
∀-I
∀x (P (x) ∨ ¬P (x))
Here clearly we have no way of moving the the excluded middle below universal introduction,
since the variable x is free before em lets us discharge the assumptions. This is where the trans-
lation from section 5.2 comes to the rescue: clearly, proofs in PA∃ will not contain applications
of rules for the universal quantiVer, and are thus suitable for our transformations. Therefore, the
last rule for which we should give a permutation is the translated rule of induction (Ind)∃ for
PA∃:
Γ ⊢ A(0) Γ ⊢ ¬∃α¬ (A(α)→ A(S(α)))
Ind∃
Γ ⊢ ¬∃α ¬A(α)
The permutations for Ind∃ will be:
...
B(0)
[A]
...
¬∃α ¬B((α)→ B(S(α)))
[¬A]
...
¬∃α ¬(B(α)→ B(S(α)))
em
¬∃α ¬(B(α)→ B(S(α)))
¬∃α ¬B
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converts to:
...
B(0)
[A]
...
¬∃α ¬(B(α)→ B(S(α)))
¬∃α ¬B
...
B(0)
[¬A]
...
¬∃α ¬(B(α)→ B(S(α)))
¬∃α ¬B em
¬∃α ¬B
and
[A]
...
B(0)
[¬A]
...
B(0)
em
B(0)
...
¬∃α ¬(B(α)→ B(S(α)))
¬∃α ¬B
converts to:
[A]
...
B(0)
...
¬∃α ¬(B(α)→ B(S(α)))
¬∃α ¬B
[¬A]
...
B(0)
...
¬∃α ¬(B(α)→ B(S(α)))
¬∃α ¬B em
¬∃α ¬B
By employing the just deVned permutation rules, we can state
Proposition 4. Every proof of a formula F in PA∃ can be transformed into a proof
D1
F
D2
F . . .
Dn
F
em
F
Where D1,D2 . . .Dn are purely intuitionistic proofs.
Proof. Proceed by induction on the structure of the proof. The base case where the proof only
containts axioms and a single rule is vacuous. Otherwise, assume there is at least one use of em
(if not the thesis holds vacuosly) and consider the lowermost rule application:
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• If it is em , then the induction hypothesis can be applied to the subtrees corresponding to
the two premises of the rule, yelding the thesis.
• As an example to the case of unary rules, consider ∃-introduction; then the proof has the
shape
...
F ′[m/α]
∃-I
∃αF ′
Applying the induction hypothesis to the subproof corresponding to the premise, by our
assumption we get a proof of the form
D1
F ′[m/α]
D2
F ′[m/α] . . .
Dn
F ′[m/α]
em
F ′[m/α]
Substitute this in the original proof: by applying the permutation rule for ∃-introduction
n − 1 times, we move the exist introduction right below the intuitionistic part; the proof
then becomes
D1
F ′[m/α]
∃αF ′
D2
F ′[m/α]
∃αF ′ . . .
Dn
F ′[m/α]
∃αF ′
em
∃αF ′
Which satisVes the thesis.
The cases of the other unary rules are analogous.
• As an example for the case of binary rules, consider→-elimination; then the proof has the
shape
...
G→ F
...
G
→-E
F
Applying the induction hypothesis to the subproofs corresponding to the premises, by our
assumption we get two proofs where in at least one of the two the last used rule is em : we
select one where this is the case.
Say we chose the proof of the Vrst premise (the other case is symmetric), then from the
induction hypothesis we have obtained a proof of the shape
D1
G→ F
D2
G→ F . . .
Dn
G→ F
em
G→ F
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After substitutig this in the original proof, we can employ the permutation for→-elimination
n− 1 times and obtain the proof
D1
G→ F
...
G
F
D2
G→ F
...
G
F . . .
Dn
G→ F
...
G
F
em
F
If the proof of G is intuitionistic we have the thesis, so assume it is not. Just as before, we
can use the induction hypothesis on it, and obtain:
D1
G→ F
E1
G . . .
Em
G
em
G
F . . .
Dn
G→ F
E1
G . . .
Em
G
em
G
F
em
F
After applyingm− 1 times the second permutation for→-elimination, we obtain
D1
G→ F
E1
G
F . . .
D1
G→ F
Em
G
F
em
F . . .
Dn
G→ F
E1
G
F . . .
Dn
G→ F
Em
G
F
em
F
em
F
Which satisVes the thesis. The cases of the other binary rules are analogous.
After these transformations we are using the excluded middle only with the statement to
prove as a conclusion. A similar result was obtained by Seldin [Sel89], but with a rule for reduc-
tion ad absurdum in place of the excluded middle and without induction.
This means that if the statement we are proving is of a certain complexity, we do not need
classical reasoning on formulas of higher complexity.
Proposition 5. Every proof inPA∃ of aΣ01 statement can be transformed into a proof in HA
∃+EM−1
Proof. By the proposition 4 we know we can transform any proof in PA∃ of a statement ∃αP into
a proof of the form
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D1
∃αP
D2
∃αP . . .
Dn
∃αP
em
∃αP
Since every application of em happens on a simply existential statement, we can directly
replace them with em− . Moreover, from section 5.1 we know that em− is equivalent to em−1 , and
thus we obtain a proof in HA∃ + EM−1 as desired.
Finally, we can conclude the section with the main theorem
Theorem 10. If PA ⊢ ∃x P with P atomic, then HA + EM−1 ⊢ ∃x P
Proof. Given a proof of ∃x P in PA, by proposition 3 we can apply the ∃-translation and obtain
a proof of (∃x P)∃ = ∃x P in PA∃. Then, by proposition 5, we can transform this in a proof in
HA∃ + EM−1 . Finally, thanks to Theorem 9, we know that HA + EM
−
1 ⊢ ∃x P.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
We have seen how the interpretation of Markov’s principle in constructive settings has been
an historically controversial matter. Kreisel showed by means of the modiVed realizability that
it could not be validated by intuitionistic logic, while Kleene’s realizability semantics, although
successful in interpreting it, reduced it to a mere unbounded search and thus brought it back
to non-constructivity. However, we noted how a much more reVned interpretation of Markov’s
principle was already present in Gödel’s work; W.W. Tait, in a more recent analysis of Gödel’s
position on intuitionism, notices how in more modern terms we could state that “if one is looking
for methods of proof which automatically yield algorithms for computing a witness for existential
theorems, intuitionistic logic is too narrow” [Tai06].
Following more recent lines of research, we introduced the logic HA + EM1, a related term
calculus following the propositions as types paradigm, and a realizability interpretation of the
former into the latter. We saw how the term system of HA + EM1 provides a tool to investigate
the computational content of Markov’s principle, and we interpreted the principle as learning
program that gets a witness for the conclusion supposing the assumption does not hold and re-
peatedly testing it. Moreover, we introduced a restricted version of HA+EM1 called HA+EM
−
1 ,
where we showed that the new logical principle added to the logic is equivalent to Markov’s
principle. This new system inherits the Curry-Howard correspondence and the realizability in-
terpretation from the one it derives from.
By means of HA + EM−1 , we have obtained a new proof of constructivity of intuitionistic
arithmetic extended with Markov’s principle. Finally, we have generalized the obtained result
and shown that Markov’s principle is also equivalent to adding to intuitionistic arithmetic the
principle EM−, that is a restricted form of the rule of excluded middle where we are only allowed
to use it in disjunction eliminations if the conclusion is simply existential.
59
6. Conclusions
This Vnal observation led us to the introduction of a new negative translation in the style of
the classic ones by Gödel and Friedman. Our new translation has the advantage of not changing
∃ and ∨ when compared to the usual ones, but needs a series of permutation rules to be applied
on proofs in order to be useful. Combining these results, we obtained a way to transform classical
proofs of Σ01 statements into proofs in HA + EM
−
1 , thus allowing us to extract programs from
any of these proofs.
Our system HA + EM−1 is reminescent of the one of Herbelin [Her10]. Here, a deductive
system for intuitionistic logic is extended with the two rules throw and catch and is equipped
with a Curry-Howard correspondence:
Γ ⊢α:T,∆ p : T
Γ ⊢∆ catchαp : T
catch
Γ ⊢∆ p : T (α : T ) ∈ ∆
Γ ⊢∆ throwαp : C
throw
The reduction rules for the lambda terms catch and throw deVne a mechanism of delimited
exceptions. Herbelin addresses pure Vrst order logic, and obtains for Markov’s principle the term
λa.catchαefq a(λb.throwαb) : ¬¬T → T
where T is a ∀, →-free formula. The behaviour of the term is similar to the one presented
in section 4.4. Thanks to this, Herbelin proves the constructivity of the logic by showing the
disjunctive and existential properties.
However, in this work we have relatedMarkov’s principle to the other semi-classical principle
EM−1 , and thus the logical part of the system results much clearer. In addition, we extended a
system of arithmetic whereas Herbelin’s work addressed pure intuitionistic logic; by presenting
also a realizability interpretation, the extracted programs can be interpreted as a way to actually
compute the witnesses for existential statements.
Another related work is [AZ14]. Here the authors extend modiVed realizability, and thus
the work has the advantage of using a purely functional language. However, just like modiVed
realizability, the realizability interpretation that is provided does not satisfy subject reduction and
is therefore not suitable for the investigation of the logical properties of the system. Moreover,
the realizer for Markov’s principle is
λz(N→U)→U 〈quote(zmtestλx.P ), if P
⊥[quote(zmtestλx.P )/x] then tt0 else z mtestλx.P 〉
where mtestλx.P := λx
N.if P then ttx else ttx. This is much less clear than what we have
seen so far, and relies on an internal comunication system based on the primitive type U , terms
⊤0 : U,⊤1 : U, . . . and ⊥0 : U,⊥1 : U, . . . and the reduction rules
ttn 7→ ⊤n ffn 7→ ⊥n
quote⊤m 7→ m quote⊥m 7→ m
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As mentioned, this thesis has the advantages of a clearer explanation of Markov’s principle
and of presenting a system that enjoys subject reduction.
Future Work
As known for example from the Veld of proof mining [Koh08] Markov’s principle is fundamen-
tal for the aim of extracting constructive information from non purely constructive proofs. A
similarly important principle is the double negation shift, stated as
∀x¬¬A(x)→ ¬¬∀xA(x)
for A atomic. In [Ili12], Danko Ilik showed that an intuitionistic logic extended with this
principle retains the disjunctive and existential properties, using techniques similar to those of
Herbelin. In the same work, he mentions that Herbelin had also extended his calculus of delim-
ited control operators to a system proving this principle. Given the relation between Herbelin’s
work on Markov’s principle and our current work, it is interesting to see if one could develop a
modiVed version of HA + EM− that is able to interpret the double negation shift. A candidate
could be the system IL + EM presented in [AZ16]: we conjecture that a version of this system
for arithmetic with restrictions similar to those presented in this thesis would be constructive; its
relationship with other principles remains to be studied.
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